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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF WARRANTLESS
NSA SURVEILLANCE: THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND
THE INJURY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Robert Bloom* & William J. Dunn**
ABSTRACT
In the past year, there have been many revelations about the tactics used by the
Bush administration to prosecute its war on terrorism. These stories involve the exploi-
tation of technologies that allow the government, with the cooperation of phone compa-
nies and financial institutions, to access phone and financial records. This Article fo-
cuses on the revelation and widespread criticism of the Bush administration's operation
of a warrantless electronic surveillance program to monitor international phone calls
and e-mails that originate or terminate with a United States party. The powerful and
secret National Security Agency heads the program and leverages its significant
intelligence collection infrastructure to further this effort. Fueling the controversy are
undeniable similarities between the current surveillance program and the improper use
of electronic surveillance that was listed as an article of impeachment for former
President Richard M. Nixon. President Bush argues that the surveillance program
passes constitutional inquiry based upon his constitutionally delegated war and foreign
policy powers, as well as the congressional joint resolution passed following the
September 11,2001 terrorist attacks. These arguments fail to supersede the explicit and
exhaustive statutory framework provided by Congress and amended repeatedly since
2001 for judicial approval and authorization for electronic surveillance. The specific
regulation by Congress based upon war powers shared concurrently with the President
provides a constitutional requirement that cannot be bypassed or ignored by the
President. The President's choice to do so violates the Constitution and risks the defi-
nite sacrifice of individual rights for speculative gain from warrantless action.
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When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking
about getting a court order before we do so.
-President George W. Bush'
We join with you in the conviction that terrorism must be fought
with the utmost vigor, but we also believe we must ensure this fight
is conducted in a manner reflective of the highest American values.
-Michael S. Greco
2
INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush responded to revelations that his administration con-
ducted warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens by stating, "As Presi-
dent and Commander in Chief, I have the constitutional responsibility and the con-
stitutional authority to protect our country.... So, consistent with U.S. law and the
Constitution, I authorized the interception of international communications of people
with known links to Al Qaida.... President Bush attempted to defend this statement
one month later by stating, "[Qither Presidents have used the same authority I've had,
to use technology to protect the American people." This latter statement is certainly
accurate, though its truth is both eerie and unsettling. Most notably, the argument that
authorization for the warrantless surveillance is provided directly from the consti-
tutional powers granted to the President harkens back to President Richard M. Nixon's
statement that, "It's quite obvious that there are certain inherently government activities,
which, if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interests of the nation's
security are lawful, but which if undertaken by private persons, are not."5
l President's Remarks in a Discussion on the PATRIOT Act in Buffalo, N.Y., 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 638, 641 (Apr. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Apr. 20, 2004 Remarks].
2 Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, American Bar Association, to President
George W. Bush (Feb. 13,2006) (on file with American Bar Association), http://www.abanet
.org/op/greco/memos/aba donsurv ltrwhthouse-0206.pdf.
3 The President's News Conference (Dec. 19, 2005), 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1885, 1885 (Dec. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 19,2005 Press Conference]. It should be noted that
these revelations focused on international calls and e-mails in which one party to the communi-
cation was in the United States. Since this press conference, additional revelations with regard
to the collection of phone call records have been reported. See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA
Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at IA.
' The President's News Conference (Jan. 26,2006), 42 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. Doc. 125,
131 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 26, 2006 Press Conference].
5 David Frost, Excerptsfrom Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects ofIndochina
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16. Nixonjustified the illegal nature of his authorized acti-
vities by appealing to presidential war powers. He stated, after referencing Abraham Lincoln's
belief in the presidential power to take unconstitutional actions to preserve the nation, that
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The comparison between the actions taken by President George W. Bush and
Richard M. Nixon are not merely academic but are unnervingly similar in substance,
scope, and perceived authority. Both included warrantless electronic surveillance
of American citizens. Both were justified by the relative administrations through
an appeal to national security imperatives. Both resulted in public outcry and con-
gressional inquiry.6
President Nixon acted in the context of a nation transfixed with the war in
Vietnam.7 While the nation fixated on the deaths of over 50,000 Americans, President
Nixon was preoccupied with the massive domestic protests that swept the country.8
President Nixon believed that these protests were initiated by foreign elements. 9
To combat this national security threat, President Nixon launched a coordinated
intelligence-gathering plan later named the Huston Plan.' ° The Huston Plan "advo-
cated the systematic use of wiretappings, burglaries, or so-called black bag jobs,
mail openings and infiltration against antiwar groups and others."' 1 Though the Huston
Plan itself lasted only five days before FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover terminated it,
President Nixon's approval of the plan, despite his explicit awareness of its illegality,
was listed in the Articles of Impeachment and cited by the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church
it has been... argued that as far as a President is concerned, that in war
time, a President does have certain extraordinary powers which would
make acts that would otherwise be unlawful, lawful if undertaken for
the purpose of preserving the nation and the Constitution, which is
essential for the rights we're all talking about.
Id.
6 See id.; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TmEs, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. The revelation of President Bush's warrantless electronic surveil-
lance and blatant disregard of the requirements provided by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act reportedly prompted United States District Judge James Robertson, a judge on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, to resign. Brian Knowlton, Judge Quits Intelligence Court; Action
Linked to Concern over U.S. Spying Without Warrants, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2005, at 5.
' See Huston Plan: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Huston Plan
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Frank Church, Chairman, S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). In addition, the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy led the Secret Service to task the National Security Agency (NSA) with the collection
of information under the national security justification of presidential protection. The National
Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm.
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 11 (1975)
[hereinafter Church Hearings] (statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., Director, NSA).
8 See Huston Plan Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.
9 See id.
10 See id.; Frost, supra note 5. The Huston Plan was named after Deputy White House
Counsel Tom Huston. Id.
11 Frost, supra note 5.
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Committee) in 1975 as "only an episode in the lawlessness which preceded and fol-
lowed its brief existence.""l The Church Committee would unearth FBI surveillance
of private citizens and of members of antiwar and civil rights groups, including
Martin Luther King, Jr. 13 The works of this committee resulted in the passage of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
The Church Committee convened to address the Huston Plan and other unnerving
intelligence community activities. One of the primary concerns expressed by Senator
Mondale was the lack of Congressional guidelines that defined and controlled agencies
such as the National Security Agency (NSA).14 He noted during hearings with the
director of the NSA, Lt. General Lew Allen, that only executive branch directives
guided NSA operations.1 5 These directives were based on policy and not law. 16 The
lack of law controlling the NSA bothered Senator Mondale and led him to challenge
Lt. General Allen with the following concern:
Given another day and another President, another perceived risk
and someone breathing hot down the neck of the military leader
then in charge of the NSA; demanding a review based on another
watch list, another wide sweep to determine whether some of the
domestic dissent is really foreign based, my concern is whether
that pressure could be resisted on the basis of the law or not.17
Senator Mondale's concern not only speaks to the motive behind the passage of
FISA, but it also was predictive of the post-September 11 surveillance." In the wake of
the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., President Bush sought to
increase the intelligence community's ability to prevent future attacks by Al Qaida. 9 In
an effort to achieve this goal, President Bush authorized the NSA to conduct electronic
surveillance on hundreds, maybe thousands, of Americans without employing the
traditional warrant process or the congressionally created foreign intelligence warrant
12 Huston Plan Hearings, supra note 7, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Frank Church); see also
Frost, supra note 5. The Church Committee received its name from Senator Frank Church
of Idaho who chaired the select committee. Church Hearings, supra note 7, at ii.
13 See S. COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
AcTIvrrIEs, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OFAMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755,
bk. 2, at 7 (1976); Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOTAct and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67, 103 (2006); Walter F. Mondale, Keeping Faith
in the Rule of Law, 63 BENCH & BAR OF MINN. 26 (2006).
14 See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 35-36 (statement by Sen. Walter Mondale,
Member, S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities).
15 Id. at 36.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 See id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
19 See Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1885.
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mechanism codified by FISA-the very act that Congress passed in 1978 after the
Watergate Scandal unearthed President Nixon's illicit NSA surveillance.2° The full
details of President Bush's 2002 authorization for electronic surveillance of
Americans remain to be disclosed, but the surreptitious nature of surveillance, the
targeting of American citizens, and the apparent disregard for Fourth Amendment
principles are known and draw undeniable similarities to actions by President Nixon.2'
It is interesting to note that Article II of the Articles of Impeachment of Richard M.
Nixon specifically states:
He Misused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service,
and Other Executive Personnel, in Violation or Disregard of the
Constitutional Rights of Citizens, by Directing or Authorizing Such
Agencies or Personnel to Conduct or Continue Electronic Surveil-
lance or Other Investigations for Purposes Unrelated to National Se-
curity, the Enforcement of Laws, or Any Other Lawful Function of
His Office; He Did Direct, Authorize, or Permit the Use of Informa-
tion Obtained Thereby for Purposes Unrelated to National Security,
the Enforcement of Laws or Any Other Lawful Function of His Of-
fice; and He Did Direct the Concealment of Certain Records Made
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Electronic Surveillance.
22
Interestingly, the Bush administration does not directly refute the accuracy or
appropriateness of the analogy to President Nixon's activities.23 Instead, the Bush
administration argues that nearly every applicable Fourth Amendment and presidential
power theory supports the permissibility of the program.24 Specifically, President Bush
argues that the Constitution grants the President the inherent power to conduct the
20 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
21 See id.
22 H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, art. 2, § 2, at 146 (1974) (The articles of impeachment
were never voted on by the entire House of Representatives due to Richard Nixon's resignation).
23 In response to a question that asked how the activities sanctioned by President Nixon dif-
fered from the current NSA surveillance, President Bush first refused to draw a distinction,
stating instead that Presidents have this power in wartime. Only after this comment did President
Bush argue that Congress had given implicit support and authority through the Authorization for
Use of Military Force joint resolution in 2001. See Jan. 26, 2006 Press Conference, supra note
4, at 131. It should be noted, however, that not all Bush administration lawyers agreed with this
surveillance. In fact, many lawyers, including the former Deputy Attorney General James
Comey, vigorously opposed the NSA surveillance. Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 35.
24 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVTIES
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006) [hereinafter
DOJ WHITE PAPER].
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electronic surveillance at issue." In addition, he argues that Congress affirmed this
power through the passage of the joint resolution authorizing force in Afghanistan
following the September 11 terrorist attacks. 26 Finally, he argues that the manner and
method of the warrantless surveillance comports with both the requirements of FISA
and the demands of the Fourth Amendment.
This Article discusses why each of the arguments put forth by the Bush admin-
istration fails to justify the warrantless surveillance under both statutory and consti-
tutional demands.28 Part I explores the function and capabilities of the NSA, and why
those capabilities are a cause for concern.29 Part II discusses the relationship be-
tween FISA and Congress's regulation of electronic surveillance for domestic crime
control through Title II30 and provides a brief description of the key aspects of the
FISA court order process and its three major exceptions. 3 Part III explains the
authority granted by the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by Congress
in 2001 through a joint resolution,32 as well as the subsequent amendments to FISA.33
Part IV argues that the NSA surveillance program is constitutionally impermissible
under FISA' s statutory framework because the President has no relevant constitutional
power to authorize warrantless surveillance. 4 Finally, Part V argues that the NSA
surveillance program violates the Fourth Amendment."
I. THE FUNCTION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
At the core of the recent electronic surveillance controversy is the NSA-a large,
secretive, and powerful agency. President Truman's initial establishment of the
agency in 1952, its subsequent operations, and even its modem capabilities exist
under a shroud of secrecy once so thick that the organization's nickname became
"No Such Agency."36 The NSA maintained and managed a large infrastructure
23 Id. at 6-10.
26 Id. at 10-13.
27 Id. at 17-28, 36-41.
28 It should be noted that this article is only addressing the NSA program that involved
listening to international calls and reading international e-mails, not the program involving
the obtaining of domestic phone records.
29 See infra notes 36-94 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 116-72 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 173-215 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 245-382 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 383-480 and accompanying text.
36 See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET
AGENCY 1, 281 (1982); Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6. Senator Church noted during the
Church Committee Hearings in 1975 that the NSA remained unknown to most Americans
at that time, both in name and in acronym. Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.
[Vol. 15:147
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF WARRANTLESS NSA SURVEILLANCE 153
footprint, but its legal authority remained scarce.37 No congressional statute created the
NSA or restricted its permissible scope of activities.38 Instead, the agency was born
from executive directives-directives vague in their delegation of authority and in
their definition of the type of information permissible for the agency to collect.39
Under this secrecy, the NSA operated and operates the nation's largest intelligence
agency, subsuming a large share of the estimated $40 billion budgeted annually to the
intelligence community.40 The NSA's role in the intelligence community is as the
primary collector of signals intelligence (SIGINT).' SIGINT is a catchall term that
includes all intelligence derived from communications, as well as from electronic and
instrumentation emissions. The NSA collects this information through highly techno-
logical sensors, including listening posts, satellites, and satellite dishes .43 For instance,
the NSA maintains over twenty satellite dishes alone in Menwith Hill, England.44 The
NSA integrates these sensors into a global spy system often referred to as ECHELON,
which is maintained with the cooperation and contribution of England, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. 45 Former Congressman Bob Barr described ECHELON
as the equivalent of a global vacuum cleaner that sucks up signal intelligence from all
over the world and then provides this information to intelligence analysts to exploit.'
The result of this global surveillance network is a massive amount of raw intel-
ligence, including virtually every electronic conversation around the world.47 This
information is generally sifted through by data mining techniques that register particular
3" See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 David Ensor, Brave New World: Agency's Challenges More Complex in Post-Cold War
Era, CNN.coM, Mar. 19,2001, http://www.cnn.comrSPECLALS/2001/nsa/stories/codebreakers/
index.html; FAS.org, Tracing the Rise and Fall of Intelligence Spending, http://www.fas.org/
irp/budget/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
41 See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Directive No. 5100.20,12.2 (Dec. 23, 197 1) (as amended
through June 24, 1991), available athttp://www.dtic.rnil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d5lOO2Op
.pdf [hereinafter Directive No. 5100.20]; FAS.org, SIGINT Overview, Mar. 9, 1997, http://
www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/overview.htm.
42 See Directive No. 5100.20, supra note 41, 3.1.
41 See Ensor, supra note 40.
4 Id. The U.S. Army Security Agency initially operated Menwith Hill Station when it
officially, though secretly, opened on September 15, 1960. See BAMFORD, supra note 36, at
208. The base provided an environment free from urban electromagnetic interference, which
made it ideal for electronic surveillance. Id. at 209. The NSA took over the operations of
Menwith Hill on August 1, 1966. Id.
45 60 Minutes: ECHELON; Worldwide Conversations Being Received (CBS television
broadcast Feb. 27, 2000) [hereinafter 60 Minutes], available at http://www.freerepublic.com/
focus/f-news/1543347/posts.
46 Douglas C. McNabb & Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, the President, and the NSA: Na-
tional Security Agency Intercepts Within the United States, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2006, at 10, 15.
41 See id.
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words, phrases, or voices. 4' The NSA collects this information for analysis by tactical
and strategic military leaders, policymakers, and other intelligence agencies.49
For much of its history, the immense capabilities and collection framework of the
NSA were limited to targeting foreign powers and organizations." The Bush admini-
stration changed that scope by allowing the NSA to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance on persons in the United States.5 No longer would the NSA restrict its
warrantless actions to foreign to foreign terminal communications, but it would now
include information originating from or going to a domestic terminal.52 The New York
Times, in the article that broke this issue to the public, estimates that the NSA eaves-
drops on an estimated 500 persons in the United States at any given time.53 President
Bush, so as to alleviate the fears stressed in reference to the intercepted calls, stated,
"They are from outside the country to in the country or vice versa. So in other
words .... if you're calling from Houston to L.A., that call is not monitored. '54 The
inclusion of any domestic terminal, however, is the crux of the concern expressed
by the public, the legal profession, and Congress.
During the 1970s, similar concerns about the capabilities and the expanding power
of the NSA were expressed by both Congress and the Supreme Court.55 Senator Church
noted the constitutional and civil liberties concerns during the 1975 congressional
hearings regarding abuse of power by the NSA stating that "[t]he danger lies in the
ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications. 56
The warrantless NSA surveillance authorized by President Bush has already shown
signs of the gradual expansion that generally follows the employment of such collection
programs.57 The program initially sought to exploit the telephone numbers and e-mail
48 See Walter Pincus, NSA Gave Other U.S. Agencies Information from Surveillance,
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2006, at A8.
" See Nat'l Sec. Agency, Signals Intelligence, http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.cfm
(last visited Aug. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Signals Intelligence].
50 Signals Intelligence, supra note 49; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
5 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
52 See id.
53 Id.
" Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1889.
51 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,312-13 (1972) ("There is,
understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability [electronic sur-
veillance] will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the
Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy."); Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 10-13, 30
(statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.) (describing the mission creep associated with the
NSA collection program, Operation MINARET).
56 Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 2.
5 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6. Such undue expansion can also occur from an
effort to be more discriminatory in the use of surveillance. For example, in Operation
MINARET, discussed infra at notes 79-86 and accompanying text, the NSA sought to
amplify its target selection by including a target's address or potential aliases. Though this
process sought great precision in the identification of a target, the result was the collection
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addresses from Al Qaida operatives captured in Afghanistan.58 It naturally expanded
to include individuals linked more and more tenuously with the originally identified
targets.59 While mere speculation, it will be interesting to see whether this program
expanded even further to include members of protest groups in the United States or
to target individuals in support of the military operation in Iraq.
The concerns associated with the NSA surveillance are not limited to institutional
apprehension, but they are closely linked to a history of abuse of this technology during
the Cold War period.' The activities and abuses by the NSA rose to public conscious-
ness during the 1970s, specifically as a result of the Watergate scandal and the resulting
congressional hearings. The particular nature of the abuses are most appropriately
understood through judicial efforts to address those activities in the Supreme Court
case of United States v. United States District Court (Keith) and through congressio-
nal efforts evidenced by the Church Committee Hearings in 1975.61
The Supreme Court, in 1972, sought to curb executive branch discretion to employ
national security wiretaps to further domestic security.62 In the Keith case, the Supreme
Court faced the question of whether the President could authorize electronic surveil-
lance without prior judicial approval in domestic security matters.63 The wiretaps at
issue were justified with the purpose "to gather intelligence information deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and
subvert the existing structure of the Government."'  The government sought to use
information gathered by this surveillance in the prosecution of three defendants charged
with the bombing of a CIA office in Michigan.65
The government argued that the President's national security power made the
surveillance lawful, despite its warrantless nature.66 The Supreme Court began its
analysis by noting that Article II of the United States Constitution provides the
President with the power and duty to protect against those who would plot against the
and use of more information. See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of
Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.).
58 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6 (detailing the original intent to exploit the information
contained in computers, cellphones, and personal phone directories of Al Qaida operatives,
including Abu Zubaydah, captured by the CIA in Afghanistan and Pakistan).
" See id. (describing how the chain of connections quickly expanded).
60 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 324 (holding the use of electronic surveillance for domestic
security without prior judicial approval unlawful); Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 2
(detailing the need for congressional hearings to address the abuse of power by the NSA).
61 407 U.S. 297. See generally Church Hearings, supra note 7.
62 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-18 ('These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion
of the Executive Branch.").
63 Id. at 299.
64 Id. at 300.
65 Id. at 299.
66 Id. at 301.
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government.67 The national security justification, however, is wrought with constitu-
tional problems, especially when "the Government attempts to act under so vague
a concept as the power to protect 'domestic security"' due to the difficulty of defining
the imperative interest. 68 The Court raised the concern that the discretion to conduct
the electronic surveillance rested solely within the executive branch, disabling the
officers in charge from constituting the neutral and disinterested judiciary contemplated
by the Fourth Amendment.69 In addition, the Court rejected the government's argu-
ments that practical circumstances foreclosed the ability to obtain a warrant and that
internal security matters are too complex and subtle for the courts to evaluate.70
Thus, the Supreme Court held that warrantless domestic electronic surveillance,
even when justified by national security imperatives, must comply with traditional
Fourth Amendment standards.71 The Court went on to invite Congress to consider
protective standards for domestic security contexts in a manner similar to the stan-
dards that were specifically detailed in congressional regulation of electronic sur-
veillance for ordinary crime. Congress responded to this invitation, in part, by de-
bating the appropriate protective standards during the Church Committee Hearings.73
Congress conducted extensive hearings into presidential abuse of power during
the Watergate scandal.74 At the Watergate Hearings, Congress and the public were
first exposed to the vast and unregulated nature of the nation's intelligence agencies
but particularly to the National Security Agency. 75 Congress acted upon these reve-
lations and public outcry by holding public and executive session hearings to under-
stand and expose the nature of the NSA's activities.76 This Congressional inquiry
would be later called the Church Committee Hearings and would serve the self-labeled
purpose of bringing "the Agency from behind closed doors."77
Senator Church and the other members of the select committee conducted much
of the hearings in closed, executive session, but the public hearings present a substan-
tive view of the illicit surveillance conducted by the NSA. 8 Information on two
67 Id. at 310.
6 Id. at 314 ("The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power.").
69 See id. at 316-17.
70 See id. at 320.
71 See id. at 320-21.
72 See id. at 322-23; Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Title III) Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(2000 & Supp. 1112003)) (providing protective standards applicable to electronic surveillance
for general crime control).
73 See generally Church Hearings, supra note 7.
71 See BAMFORD, supra note 36, at 289-90.
75 See id.
76 See generally Church Hearings, supra note 7.
17 Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 1 (statement of Sen. Frank Church).
78 See, e.g., id. at 30,57-58 (detailing secret surveillance programs Operation MINARET
and Operation SHAMROCK).
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previously classified programs, Operation MINARET and Operation SHAMROCK,
was approved for public dissemination, and those programs provide an illuminating
view of what FISA sought to prevent from occurring in the future.79
Operation MINARET officially began in 1969. It formalized the process that
began in 1967 to utilize the NSA to intercept communications in order to determine
the existence of foreign influence on civil disturbances occurring in the United
States related to the Vietnam War and to assist in presidential protection.80 During
the period between its inception and its subsequent discovery and termination in
1973, the emphasis of the NSA surveillance soon expanded to include international
drug trafficking and acts of terrorism.81
In practice, MINARET constituted a "watch list" of activity whereby the NSA
sorted through the electronic communication captured by identifying particular words,
names, subjects, and locations." The problematic nature of MINARET entailed the
placement of American citizens and organizations on the watch list. 3 During
MINARET's operational years, the watch lists contained roughly 1,650 names of
United States citizens, with up to 800 names on the list at any given time. 4 The
operation internally justified the activity not only based upon the national security
need for the information, but also because it expanded the term "foreign intelligence"
to require only one foreign terminal from which the communications originated.
85
It was, however, this ability to define foreign intelligence to include domestic terminals
and persons that led to congressional criticism.86
The second clandestine program that the Church Committee unearthed and exposed
to the public was codenamed Operation SHAMROCK. 7 SHAMROCK entailed a
message-collection program whereby the NSA tasked private international telegraph
79 See id.
80 See id. at 10-11,30 (statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.). Indications exist that
this surveillance began even earlier in the 1960s to monitor United States citizens traveling to
Cuba. See id. at 10. This concern likely dovetailed with concerns at the time that the assas-
sination of President Kennedy resulted from Cuban retaliation for attempts against the life
of Fidel Castro. See S. COMM. ON ASSASSINATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 95-1828, pt. 2, at 109-14
(1979). The 1969 charter for MINARET was to provide for "more restrictive control and
security of sensitive information derived from communications" and "specifically include[d]
communications concerning individuals or organizations involved in civil disturbances, anti-
war movements/demonstrations and military deserters involved in anti-war movements." Id. at
150 (Exhibit 3: July 1, 1969 Memo from an Assistant Director, NSA).
81 Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 11 (statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.).
82 Id. at 10.
83 See id. The problematic nature of Operation MINARET became even more apparent
after the Supreme Court's decision in Keith described supra in notes 61-72. See BAMFORD,
supra note 36, at 292.
84 Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 12.
85 See id. at 10.
86 See id. at 37-38.
87 Id. at 57-58.
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companies to provide certain international communications to the intelligence agency."
This program originally began operating in 1947 under the control of the Army
Security Agency, which relinquished operational control over SHAMROCK first to
the Armed Forces Security Agency upon its creation in 1949 and then again to the
NSA in 1952.89
At the outset of the program, the efforts focused on extracting only "international
telegrams relat[ed] to certain foreign targets." 90 This purpose changed throughout
the years to include the extraction of telegrams for certain United States citizens.9'
As with Operation MINARET, no constitutional infirmity resulted from Operation
SHAMROCK while its efforts targeted foreign terminal to foreign terminal communi-
cations.92 Operation SHAMROCK became illegal, both as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and, as argued at the Church Committee,
in violation of the Communications Act of 1934, once it began to target United States
citizens and domestic terminals.93 A noteworthy and instructive element of both
Operation MINARET and Operation SHAMROCK is that each program gradually
and shamelessly expanded beyond its original scope and initial justification.94
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE III AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT
As a result of the Church Hearings, Congress felt compelled to take remedial action
in terms of a comprehensive statutory framework.95 The result was the passage of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978.96 FISA began, however,
not as a separate act but as an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title I1). 97 Title III authorized and regulated the use
88 Id. The private companies were RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western
Union International. Id. (statement of Sen. Frank Church); see BAMFORD, supra note 36, at
240-41 (describing the details of the message-collection program instituted with RCA).
89 Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 59.
90 Id. at 58.
9' Id. During the 1970s, NSA subjected roughly 150,000 messages per month to further
review by intelligence analysts. Id. at 60. Cf BAMFORD, supra note 36, at 241 (detailing the
concerns about illegality of such a program expressed by both Western Union and RCA).
92 See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 10, 60.
93 See id. at 62 (statement of Sen. Gary Hart, Member, S. Select Comm. to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities).
94 See id. at 12-13, 57-58 (statements of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., and Sen. Frank
Church).
9' See id. at 61. Senator Goldwater, while arguing against disclosure of this information
to the public, conceded that "[t]he American people expect the Congress to take remedial
action when necessary." Id.
96 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2002).
" See Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)); see also Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan &
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of electronic surveillance for criminal law enforcement purposes. It required that
such surveillance be authorized by prior judicial approval and circumscribed the
conditions for its use.98 Congress intended the passage of Title III to ensure the privacy
interests of domestic persons, while providing the government with the flexibility
to ensure effective crime control." The process and procedures provided by Title HI
for the Attorney General to seek a court order authorizing electronic surveillance
were drafted to satisfy constitutional requirements provided by the Supreme Court
in Katz v. United States"°° and Berger v. New York.101 It should be pointed out that
Katz included oral communications within the purview of the Fourth Amendment
even if no physical trespass was required to obtain these conversations.1 2
The procedures provided by Title H sought to regulate electronic surveillance
for criminal law enforcement, but they did not attempt to address electronic surveillance
conducted pursuant to national security interests. 3 Title III included a proviso in the
original section 2511(3) that expressed congressional neutrality on the issue of regulat-
ing the President's national security powers to conduct electronic surveillance.1 4
Based on that proviso and the general purpose of Title Im, the Supreme Court, in
Keith, stated that the act did "not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the
President to meet domestic threats to the national security."0 5
The Supreme Court in Keith also recognized that different protective schemes
may be required when distinguishing between efforts to conduct general criminal
surveillance and those that involve domestic security.' °6 Congress would accept this
invitation to provide a separate but integrated protective scheme for electronic sur-
veillance driven by national security interests with the passage of FISA.'07 In passing
Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, Am. Law Div., Cong. Res. Serv., 14-17 (Jan. 5.2006)
[hereinafter Bazan & Elsea], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/mO10506.pdf (pro-
viding a general framework and analysis for the constitutional and statutory arguments that the
President has employed to justify the NSA electronic surveillance).
98 United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1972); Bazan & Elsea,
supra note 97, at 14.
99 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 302.
100 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
0' 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that the use of electronic devices to hear conversations
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment); see Keith, 407 U.S. at 102; Bazan & Elsea,
supra note 97, at 8. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (holding that the Fourth Amendment
applies to recording oral statements).
102 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
103 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 308.
104 See id. at 302-03. The insertion of this proviso was orchestrated, at least in part, by
Roy Banner, a top lawyer at the NSA. BAMFORD, supra note 36, at 256. Banner helped draft
this loophole to provide the legal cover for the NSA's domestic signal intelligence. Id.
105 Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
106 Id. at 322-23 ("Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government for intelligence
information and the protected rights of our citizens.").
107 See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 17-18. See generally FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§
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FISA, Congress carved a separate legal regime from Title III to address and govern
the collection of "foreign intelligence" through electronic surveillance methods."08
Title III remains to govern ordinary criminal law enforcement purposes. " Congress
in enacting FISA sought to "provide the secure framework by which the executive
branch may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
within the context of this Nation's commitment to privacy and individual rights.""0
The different protective schemes for the use of electronic surveillance provided
in Title I and FISA demonstrate the different balancing of the governmental interest
against the resulting privacy intrusion on an individual. "' Specifically, under Title II,
the Attorney General or an authorized representative must apply for a court order
approving the electronic surveillance through a process similar to a search warrant." 2
The statute strictly prohibits nearly all electronic surveillance conducted outside of
the court authorization detailed in section 2516.113 FISA does not provide for any
wide-ranging exceptions for non-authorized surveillance, but three statutorily cir-
cumscribed exceptions exist and are described below."'
The comparison and relationship between the protective schemes provided in
Title III and those provided in FISA are illuminating because they show: (1) broad,
if not exclusive, congressional regulation in the sphere of electronic surveillance; (2)
specific congressional intent for FISA to govern foreign intelligence surveillance as
distinct from general criminal law enforcement; and (3) the provision of a more
relaxed protective standard and application process to allow the executive branch
to address the national security need for foreign intelligence collection through a
congressionally authorized statutory scheme.' '
A. Statutory Framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
The protective scheme designed by Congress for the collection of foreign intel-
ligence sought to recognize and address the government's legitimate need to collect
1801-1811 (2002).
10' Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 17-18.
109 Id. at 14.
110 S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,3916.
"'. See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18 (detailing the relaxed probable cause standard
in FISA compared with the more traditional probable cause requirement in Title III).
112 See Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
"' See id. § 2511. Section 2511 (1) applies a civil penalty to any person who "intentionally
intercepts," "intentionally uses," or "intentionally discloses" electronic communications except
for narrow exceptions such as when the person has been authorized by a separate federal
statute (e.g., FISA). Id. § 2511 (1)(a)-(e).
114 See infra notes 147-72 and accompanying text.
"1 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3907 (describing the intent of
Congress for FISA and Title Il to constitute the exclusive means by which domestic electronic
surveillance may be conducted); David Cole et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress,
N.Y. REvIEw OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 14.
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such intelligence, while also providing a method for judicial intervention to protect
against invasions into the privacy interests of individuals unearthed during the Church
Committee Hearings.1
16
In order to effectuate this delicate balancing between the important government
interest and the protection of individual privacy, Congress designed and implemented
a special court that would provide both the expediency and secrecy needed to address
foreign intelligence concerns, while retaining the important protection of placing a
neutral judicial representative between the government enforcement officials-the
intelligence community as represented by the Attorney General-and the people or
places targeted for surveillance. '17 The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) and the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(Court of Review) were constituted to serve this purpose.'18 The composition of the
FISC originally included "seven U.S. district court judges publicly designated by the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court."" 9 Three U.S. district court or
U.S. court of appeals judges, again publicly designated by the Chief Justice, constituted
and still constitute the Court of Review. 120
Congress designed this special court system to review executive branch applica-
tions for electronic surveillance aimed at obtaining foreign intelligence.' 21 This appli-
cation process sought to mirror the traditional law enforcement warrant process to
the extent that national security exigency and practicality would allow. 12  This
congressionally preferred application process also envisions situations when, similar
to the traditional warrant process, the exigency of the situation demands a deviation
from the more formal procedure. 123 To accommodate these special circumstances,
FISA includes three exceptions that provide additional latitude for the executive
branch. 24 The first exception allows for surveillance without a court order when the
116 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7-8, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3908-09 ("[This bill] goes a
long way in striking a fair and just balance between protection of national security and pro-
tection of personal liberties.").
"'. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONs 8-16
(CONG. REs. SERV. 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30465.pdf.
118 See id. at 2 n.6.
119 Id. The USA PATRIOT Act increased the FISC to eleven district court judges, at least
three of whom must live within a twenty-mile radius of the District of Columbia. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272,283
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
120 BAZAN, supra note 117, at 2 n.6.
121 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 5, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3907.
122 See id. at 5-6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3906-07 (recognizing that exigent circumstances
may require a limited departure from the congressionally preferred judicial application and
approval process).
123 See id.
124 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1805(f), 1811.
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targets are solely foreign governmental entities because of the lesser privacy interests
at stake.125 The second and third exceptions allow for surveillance with only retro-
spective FISC review because the national security imperative renders immediate
surveillance necessary and the traditional court order process impracticable.126
Finally, if the FISC denies the application for electronic surveillance, FISA provides
two layers ofjudicial review, with appeal first to the Court of Review and second to the
United States Supreme Court. 27
The FISC order process differs from the traditional warrant process as it provides
greater deference to the executive branch through relaxed application standards. 12'
After an application is made, a FISC judge must issue a warrant if: (1) the President
has authorized the Attorney General to approve applications for such electronic sur-
veillance; 129 (2) the application has been approved by the Attorney General; 30 (3)
on the basis of facts submitted to the court, probable cause exists to believe the target
of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the place
at which the surveillance is directed is being used or about to be used by that foreign
power or agent;'31 (4) the minimization procedures (minimization) seek to limit acquisi-
tion, retention, and dissemination; 132 and (5) if the target is a United States person,
125 See id. § 1802; S. REP. No. 95-604, at 50, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3951-52.
126 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(f), 1811; S. REP. No. 95-604, at 51-52, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953; H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063. For a further discussion of these exceptions, see infra notes 147-72
and accompanying text.
127 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 5, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3906 (detailing the intent to provide
two layers of appeal for the government after a denial of a FISA warrant by the FISC).
128 See, e.g., Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18, 23-26 (detailing FISA's relaxed probable
cause standard and the major exceptions designed to provide limited executive branch electronic
surveillance based on exigent circumstances).
129 This requirement is largely formalistic, but its purpose is consistent with Congress's
desire to provide an internal check by requiring written accountability within the executive
branch for the decision to engage in electronic surveillance. See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 48-49,
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
130 The Attorney General's certification must be in writing to serve the internal check
function, and it must attest to the satisfaction of the statutory requirements for the application
detailed in § 1804 and that, under his or her belief, probable cause exists. FISA, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(2); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 43-44, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3945. The statutory
requirements for the application are set forth in § 1804. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a). The require-
ment that the Attorney General, Acting Attorney General, or Deputy Attorney General personally
approve the application was intended to provide a bulwark against high-ranking official
pressure from the heads of agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 36, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3937-38.
'' The requirement for probable cause is discussed further infra at notes 139-46 and
accompanying text.
132 The flexibility given to the executive branch in the FISA requirements is intended to be
offset by the requirement for reasonable minimization procedures. These procedures are designed
to restrict the information obtained concerning United States persons through electronic surveil-
lance to foreign intelligence pursuant to a general policy of limiting the acquisition, retention, and
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the certification is not clearly erroneous. 33 Congress intended through this framework
to provide a scheme of internal checks within the executive branch and external checks
with the interjection of review by a neutral judge to curb arbitrary executive action.134
The deference provided to the executive branch in this process is evident from the
limited, ministerial judicial review by the FISC judge and the relaxed probable cause
standard. First, when the executive branch satisfies the application requirements, the
FISC judge must issue the FISA warrant.135 The FISC judge is not permitted to substi-
tute his or her judgment for that of the executive branch and has no authority to "look
behind" the application."' The one exception to this lack of discretion occurs when
the surveillance targets a United States person.137 "In such a case, the judge must
review the certifications to determine whether they are clearly erroneous." 38
The second area of deference to the executive involves the requirement of probable
cause.'39 The probable cause requirement in Title III closely tracks the traditional
probable cause requirement and necessitates a showing that the "target has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit a crime."14 FISA, however, requires only that the
dissemination of information. See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 54-55, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3956;
S. REP. No. 95-701, at 41 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4010. Congress
recognized that the best practice to accomplish this goal is to encourage the destruction of
information that provides no foreign intelligence information. S. REP. No. 95-701, at 42, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4011. The definition of "minimization procedures" requires a course of action
"reasonably designed" in relation to the specific purpose of the electronic surveillance requested.
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h)(1). The specific procedures required, therefore, are fact-specific and
may depend upon the scope of the enterprise under investigation, the location and operation of
the target, the government's expectations of the character of the parties and calls, and the length
of the surveillance. S. REP. No. 95-604, at 37-38, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3939. The Attorney
General must provide a statement of the proposed minimization procedures and the FISC judge
will review the statements for their reasonableness. FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4).
133 The "clearly erroneous" standard is discussed further infra notes 137-38 and accompany-
ing text. For the necessary findings required before issuance of a FISA warrant, see FISA,
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
134 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 48-49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
135 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) ("Upon an application made pursuant to section 1804 of
this title, the judge shall enter an ex parte order.. . .") (emphasis added); see S. REP. No.
95-604, at 48-49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
136 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 48, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950. Though this may appear
to present a rubber stamp procedure, the purpose is to assure written accountability within
the executive branch for the decision to engage in electronic surveillance, thus providing an
internal check against arbitrariness. Id. at 48-49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
137 Id. at 48, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
138 Id. The "clearly erroneous" standard was intended to be less strict than a finding of
probable cause. Id.
139 See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18.
140 Id.; see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,313 (1959) (defining probable cause for
general law enforcement as "where 'the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
target of the electronic surveillance be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
and that each of the places targeted is or will be used by a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power.14' As a result, the standard for probable cause in the FISA context is
not as strict as for general crime control.' 42 FISA does not require a finding that a crime
is imminent or that the elements of a specific crime exist, but it requires instead a
more speculative standard that allows surveillance to occur at an earlier stage in the
investigative process. 143 This speculative standard is evidenced in the agency-based
definition for an "agent of a foreign power."'" A person may satisfy this statutory
definition, and thus satisfy the probable cause requirement, when a person "knowingly
engages" or "may involve" oneself in subversive activities. 45 In addition, the FISC
judge must make this determination based upon the facts and circumstances provided
by the executive branch." The probable cause requirement, therefore, defers greatly
to the executive branch to allow it to determine when probable cause exists and then to
provide the FISC judge only limited discretion to challenge such a determination.
B. Exceptions to the Congressionally Preferred Court Order Process
In addition to the deference and flexibility that Congress gave to the executive
branch for obtaining ajudicial order authorizing electronic surveillance, Congress also
contemplated three scenarios when the exigencies of national security needs could
require limited surveillance without a FISC order. 47 Each of these scenarios defers in
favor of the national security imperatives when balancing the need for adequate intelli-
gence against the preservation of privacy rights.'48 Congress sought, however, to limit
these exceptions to court-ordered electronic surveillance by restricting the target and
duration, as well as imposing additional procedural safeguards. 49
is being committed." (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).
141 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2002); see Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18. The six
groups or entities that constitute a "foreign power" and the groups or individuals that represent
an "agent of a foreign power" are defined in § 1801. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(b).
142 See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 11-13 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973,
3980-81.
143 See id.
'44 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
145 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
146 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3).
"47 FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1) (electronic surveillance of communications exclusively
between or among foreign powers for up to one year), 1805(f) (emergency orders for up to
seventy-two hours), 1811 (wartime exigency for up to fifteen days following a congressional
declaration of war).
141 See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, 1, 3-5, 50-51 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3904, 3905-06, 3952.
149 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1) (surveillance on foreign powers for up to one year),
1805(f) (emergency orders for up to seventy-two hours), 1811 (fifteen days after declaration
of war).
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The most expansive exception to court-ordered surveillance occurs when the elec-
tronic surveillance targets official foreign powers (Foreign Powers Exception). 150 Con-
gress provided the executive branch with the ability to conduct electronic surveillance
to acquire foreign intelligence for up to one year without a court order as long as the
Attorney General certifies in writing to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the following con-
ditions exist: (1) the target falls within an official foreign power definition, (2) there is
no substantial likelihood a United States person will be a party to the communication,
and (3) reasonable minimization procedures are in place.15' The Attorney General's cer-
tification must occur at least thirty days prior to the effective date of the surveillance,
unless the surveillance must occur immediately, which then requires the Attorney Gen-
eral to notify the committees immediately.152 In addition, the Attorney General must, in
all situations, "immediately transmit" a copy of the certification under seal to the FISC.
15 3
In order for the Attorney General to authorize the surveillance, there is no require-
ment of judicial review or approval,'54 no need to provide a factual detail of the infor-
mation sought by the electronic surveillance, 155 and no court control over the duration
of the surveillance unless it exceeds one year.156 Instead, arbitrary electronic surveil-
lance is limited by the internal checks required to obtain the Attorney General's appro-
val, the external checks of written justification to the FISC and the congressional
committees, and the substantive check of statutory requirements.
57
The definition of foreign powers in this exception provides the most substantive
check on its scope.158 The Foreign Powers Exception only applies to entities that
are clearly "arms of a government.'1 5 This definition excludes the more privately-
controlled entities such as terrorist groups and foreign-based political organizations,
as well as the entire category of agents of a foreign power."
150 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A).
151 Id. § 1802(a)(1).
152 Id.
15 Id. § 1802(a)(3).
15 Congress did intend, however, for limitedjudicial review of the effectiveness of the mini-
mization procedures in order to protect United States persons from undue surveillance. See
S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 51 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3952.
151 Congress, when discussing the exception of the same official foreign powers fromprovid-
ing a factual description under the preferred court ordered process, stated that "the sensitivity of
the surveillance is greatly multiplied while the risk of a fruitless surveillance which will not ob-
tain any foreign intelligence information is greatly reduced." Id. at 45,1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3946.
156 Id. at 48-50, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950-51.
'57 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a).
1 See id. § 1801(a)-(c); S. REP. No. 95-701, at 17 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3986.
' See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 17, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3986.
160 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (partially incorporating the definition of foreign
power in § 1801(a)); § 1801(a)(l)-(3); cf. § 1801(a)(4)-(6).
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This substantive restriction not only limits the exception but justifies it. The inclu-
sion of this exception amended the original Senate bill and provoked widespread
criticism among the Senate Judiciary Committee.16 1 The Ford administration argued
for the exception and justified it on three grounds: (1) the determination that an entity
fits one of the three special classes of foreign powers "is not likely to be erroneous,"
(2) "the likelihood of obtaining valuable foreign intelligence" from these targets is
high, and (3) such surveillance is likely required for longer periods of time. 162
Congress also contemplated that the need for electronic surveillance could occur
during an emergency when obtaining a court order would be impossible before the
surveillance should begin. 163 In such a situation, Congress intended to place the
Attorney General in the role of the FISC during the emergency period until judicial
review could be obtained."6
The limits on this exception include the expiration of authorization for such
electronic surveillance after seventy-two hours or when the information sought is
obtained. 165 In addition, the following requirements must also be satisfied: (1) the
factual basis exists under the general FISA requirements to support the surveillance;
(2) a FISA judge must be immediately notified of the emergency surveillance, (3)
an application pursuant to the preferred method of authorization must be processed
as soon as practicable, 166 and (4) minimization procedures must still be followed. 167
This exception also incorporates an exclusionary provision that prevents information
gathered through this exception to be used in a judicial proceeding unless the FISC
issued a court order approving the surveillance. 168 The limits placed on this excep-
tion balance the need to provide the executive branch with the flexibility to respond
to immediate, emergency national security needs within a framework that retains the
external checks of judicial review. 169
161 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 50, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3951-52.
162 Id.
163 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0.
'64 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 52, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953.
165 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).
"6 Id. This application must be made even if the surveillance is terminated before the twenty-
four hour emergency period expires. See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 52, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953.
167 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0.
168 Id. ("In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where
the electronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no
information obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence
or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United
States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any
other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with
the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious
bodily harm to any person.").
169 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 51-52, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953.
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The final exception allows the Attorney General to authorize electronic surveil-
lance without a court order in a time of war. 70 This authorization expires after fifteen
days and requires a preceding declaration of war by Congress. 171 Congress intended
this exception to provide a limited time period in which the President could conduct
electronic surveillance without a court order while Congress considered whether any
amendments to FISA were required to address the new wartime scenario.
72
I1. THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE
The Bush administration makes three principle and mutually independent argu-
ments in an effort to defend the legality of the warrantless electronic surveillance
program.7 3 Specifically, the administration argues that: (1) the surveillance program
satisfies the statutory requirements of FISA;7 (2) the President retains inherent and
exclusive authority to conduct such an electronic surveillance program; 175 and (3)
even if the President does not have exclusive authority, Congress affirmatively en-
dorsed the President's actions.7 6
In advancing the first and third arguments, the administration relies upon a broad
interpretation of the 2001 joint resolution of Congress referred to as the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force (AUMF).177 Congress passed the AUMF in the wake
of the September 11 terrorist attacks and in anticipation of an armed invasion of
Afghanistan. 78 Congress and the President worked in concert over two hectic days
to draft and pass the joint resolution. 179 The resulting resolution passed on September
14, 2001 includes a long preamble detailing the terrorist attacks and the need for a
national response followed by a general paragraph that states:
170 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811.
171 Id.
172 H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4048, 4063.
173 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6-13, 17-28.
174 Id. at 17-28 (arguing that the surveillance program satisfied the FISA statutory
framework).
171 Id. at 6-10 (discussing the President's inherent power).
176 Id. at 10-13 (discussing Congress's endorsement of the President's actions).
117 See id. at 10-13, 17-28; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub.
L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000 & Supp. 1112003)).
178 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, AuTHORIzATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE
TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATiVE HISTORY 1-2 (CONG. RES. SERv. 2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf (providing the legislative history
of the passage of the AUMF); Tom Daschle, Editorial, Power We Didn't Grant, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 2005, at A21.
179 See GRIMMETT, supra note 178, at 1-2; Daschle, supra note 178.
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That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons. 1
80
The administration argues that the broad language of the AUMF, including the
phrase "all necessary and appropriate force," implicitly authorized the President to
conduct the warrantless surveillance of domestic targets. 8 ' In addition, the adminis-
tration relies upon the 2004 United States Supreme Court case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, s2
that interpreted the AUMF broadly enough to authorize the detention of an American
citizen captured on the battlefield of Afghanistan.
183
The administration errs, however, when interpreting the AUMF to include elec-
tronic surveillance of domestic targets because: (1) the legislative history demon-
strates the limited authority granted to the President and (2) the Hamdi holding does
not extend the "battlefield" to which the AUMF applies to the United States.
A. The Legislative History of the A UMF Demonstrates a Limited Grant of Authority
The legislative history of the AUMF is sparse due to its quick enactment resulting
from a decision to forego the formal committee legislative review process." A com-
parison of the White House and congressional drafts of the joint resolution and the
public statements made during the drafting process provides some information on
the extent of authority granted.185 The original draft resolution provided by the White
House contained broad language that would authorize the President to use force
against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, as well as "to deter and pre-empt
any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.' 86 This last pro-
vision authorized force without any requisite nexus between the threat of attack and
the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks.'87 Richard Grimmett, in his Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress on this issue, states that this portion of the draft
resolution sparked strong opposition in Congress, when a concern about the extent
180 See GRIMMETT, supra note 178, at 6 (containing the text of the joint resolution for the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, September 14, 2001).
181 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 10-13.
182 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
183 Id. at 519; see DOJ WHrrE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12-13.
184 See GRIMMETT, supra note 178, at 2.
185 See id. at 2-3.
186 Id. at 5-6 (providing the text of the original White House proposal).
187 See id.
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of the authorization led to a key amendment to the resolution.188 The joint resolution
that resulted limited the grant of authorization to the use of force against those in-
volved in the attacks on September I 189 The modification Congress made to the
White House draft makes clear that the extent of the authorization does not apply to
terrorists generally but only to those people or parties directly connected to the
attacks.' 9°
Former Senator Daschle, who helped negotiate the joint resolution, also recounted
after the revelation of NSA surveillance in December 2005 that the administration
sought to add the term "in the United States" after "appropriate force" in the text of
the resolution.191 Senator Daschle explained that this addition "would have given the
president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just overseas-where we
all understood he wanted authority to act-but right here in the United States, poten-
tially against American citizens."'92 The administration, by seeking this amendment,
clearly demonstrated its understanding that its power was limited to overseas. 93 Thus,
based on this legislative history, the AUMF did not authorize the use of electronic sur-
veillance for domestic terminals but restricted the extent of the authority given to the
President to prosecute armed conflict overseas. 94
B. The Hamdi Holding Does Not Extend the "Battlefield" to Which the A UMF
Applies to the United States
The Attorney General also makes the argument for a broad reading of the AUMF
based upon the United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.1 95
In Hamdi, the Court addressed the issue of whether the AUMF constituted an "Act
of Congress" that would render the Non-Detention Act inapplicable to the capture of
an American citizen.' 96 The administration argued for a broad interpretation of the
AUMF that would allow the government to bypass the Non-Detention Act and detain
American citizens indefinitely based on the authority granted by the AUMF.197 The
188 See id. at 2-3.
189 The language was changed to authorize necessary force "to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
(emphasis added). AUMF, 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
190 See GRIMMETT, supra note 178, at 3.
191 Daschle, supra note 178.
192 Id.
193 See id.
'9 See id.; see also GRIMMETr, supra note 178, at 2-3.
195 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
196 Id. at 510-11, 516-17. The applicable section of the Non-Detention Act reads: "No
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress." 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
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Supreme Court agreed with the government's conclusion, but it did so by applying
a much narrower interpretation of the AUMF.'98
Instead of reading the AUMF as a broad authorization of force against terrorism
generally, the Court provided a narrow holding that the AUMF authorizes that
[t]he United States may detain, for the duration of these hostili-
ties, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combat-
ants who "engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States." If the record establishes that United States troops are
still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions
are part of the exercise of "necessary and appropriate force," and
therefore are authorized by the AUMF.1 99
When the military detained an American citizen who fell within this category, he
or she could be detained for the duration of the active hostilities because detention
constituted an important incident of war.2"0 The Court went on to find active hostilities
to be ongoing by referencing a conventional indication of armed conflict-troop
strength-to demonstrate that Afghanistan remained a battlefield and then proceeded
to distinguish the Civil War era Supreme Court case of Exparte Milligan.20' Milligan
stands for the proposition that American citizens may not be tried by military tribunals
when they are not captured on the battlefield of war.2°2 In Milligan, the incident to
war-military tribunals--could only be properly employed in a battlefield where
Article III courts were inoperable.2 3 The Court in Hamdi applied the equivalent of
the Milligan battlefield concept and narrowly held detention-the incident of war
at issue-proper when an American citizen is captured on the battlefield. °4
The Hamdi holding, therefore, does not aid the administration in justifying the
NSA surveillance pursuant to the AUMF. °5 In fact, the administration misstates
the holding when it says that Hamdi "authorize[s] the detention of an American
within the United States."2 '6 The Court in Hamdi clearly stated that the narrow issue
addressed was whether an American citizen found on the battlefield in Afghanistan
198 See id. at 518-20.
199 See id. at 521.
200 See id. at 518-20.
201 See id. at 521-22.
202 See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) ("If, in foreign invasion or civil
war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according
to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is
a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the
safety of the army and society.. .
203 Id.
204 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521-22.
205 See id.
206 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12.
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could be detained in contravention of the Non-Detention Act.207 The Court's holding
does not reach whether an American citizen could have been detained within the
United States pursuant to the AUMF, which would provide the pure analogy.208
To apply Hamdi, one must recognize the incident of war at issue to be electronic
surveillance instead of detention but the battlefield would, as in Hamdi, be limited
to the field of traditional, armed conflict (Afghanistan). 2 9 The battlefield would not
extend to include domestic terminals within the United States, much as the battlefield
of the Civil War did not extend into the state of Indiana.1 ° If it did, then the natural
expansion would be, as Robert Levy at the Cato Institute points out, that the AUMF
would apply to pure domestic to domestic terminal surveillance as well.211 If Indiana
did not constitute a battlefield during the Civil War, New Jersey certainly does not
constitute a battlefield when the armed forces are engaged in Afghanistan.212
This interpretation of the AUMF is consistent with the recent five-three decision
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the Supreme Court addressed the President's power
to establish military tribunals for suspected terrorists being held in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.2" In interpreting the AUMF, the Court found nothing in the text of legislative
history hinting that Congress wanted to alter the provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.21 4 Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, characterized it this way:
"Congress has not issued the Executive a 'blank check."'215
C. Congress Speaks After the A UMF: Subsequent Amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act
The Bush administration also proceeds with its arguments for the legality of the
warrantless electronic surveillance under the supposition that the AUMF represents
207 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516, 519.
208 See id. at 519.
209 See id. at 521-22.
210 See id.; Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
211 See Wartime Executive Power and the NSA 's Surveillance Authority II: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement by Robert A. Levy, Ph.D., J.D.,
Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute), available at http://www.constitution
project.org/pdf/levyjtestimonyj2_28_06.pdf [hereinafter Wartime Executive PowerHearings]
("The same logic that argues for warrantless surveillance of foreign-to-domestic and domestic-
to-foreign communications would permit warrantless surveillance ofall-domestic communi-
cations as well." (emphasis added)).
212 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127.
213 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). It was a five-three decision with Justice Stevens writing for the
majority. Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined in the opinion, each writing separate concur-
rences. The three dissenters were Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Chief Justice Roberts,
who participated in the lower court decision, took no part in the decision.
214 See id. at 2775.
215 See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the most recent congressional action on the issue of electronic surveillance.2"6
Congress has, however, spoken multiple times since September 18, 2001, the date of
the enactment of the AUMF, on this issue through statutory amendments to FISA.217
The most substantial amendments to FISA came from the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act).218 In addition to the PATRIOT Act, Congress also has
made substantial amendments through the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002,219 the Homeland Security Act of 2002,220 the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,221 and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005.222
The amendments to FISA were not passed solely on congressional initiative but
were passed, ironically, in response to needs identified by the Bush administration.223
President Bush, in an address to the nation and to a Joint Session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, stated, "We will come together to give law enforcement the
additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together
to strengthen our intelligence capabilities, to know the plans of terrorists before they
act and find them before they strike., 224 He also recognized the continued vitality
of a court order process when he said,
When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking
about getting a court order before we do so. It's important for our
fellow citizens to understand, when you think PATRIOT Act,
constitutional guarantees are in place when it comes to doing
what is necessary to protect our homeland, because we value the
Constitution.225
This and similar statements made by the President identified the need for changes
to the existing FISA structure, but they also implied the continued vitality of FISA
requirements and the intent to act within those statutory requirements.226
216 See generally DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24.
217 See BAZAN, supra note 117, at exsum.
211 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at scattered sections in 50 U.S.C.
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
219 Pub. L. No. 107-108, 115 Stat. 1394 (2001).
220 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
221 Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
222 Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
223 See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1347, 1350 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Sept. 20, 2001 Address].
224 id.
225 Apr. 20, 2004 Remarks, supra note 1, at 641.
226 See id.; Sept. 20, 2001 Address, supra note 223, at 1350.
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Congress responded to the call for changes to FISA by providing the President and
the executive branch additional flexibility to conduct electronic surveillance under
FISA.227 The PATRIOT Act made significant modifications to the scope of surveil-
lance allowed under FISA and increased the bureaucratic ability of the FISC to handle
more FISA applications." Specifically, the PATRIOT Act provided additional district
court judges, roving and multipoint electronic surveillance authority, more flexibility
for pen registers and trap and trace devices, and additional access to business records.229
The PATRIOT Act also made a significant modification that lessened the require-
ment for valid electronic surveillance from one with the primary purpose of obtaining
foreign intelligence to one with a significant purpose.23 ° Congress intended that the
change promote the sharing of information between the intelligence community and
the law enforcement community.231 In addition, Congress recognized the overlap be-
tween traditional law enforcement purposes and intelligence purposes, and it sought
to ensure that FISA did not restrict the use of the statutory framework in cases when
this overlap existed. 32 The Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case, affirmed this inter-
pretation of the addition of the word "significant" and held that it allowed the gov-
ernment to use the FISC order to conduct electronic surveillance as long as some
broader objective existed than solely criminal prosecution.233
The PATRIOT Act also expanded the authority to address two concerns uniquely
associated with the terrorist threat: (1) roving or multipoint surveillance234 and (2)
the "lone wolf' amendment. 235 Through the allowance for roving or multipoint sur-
veillance, Congress sought to modernize FISA to allow the government to continue
to intercept a terrorist's communications despite the target changing cell phones
frequently or moving from safehouse to safehouse without having to return for a
new court order for each new phone or landline used.236 The "lone wolf' amendment
227 See BAZAN, supra note 117, at exsum, 1.
228 See id. at 1.
229 Id.
230 See id. at 15-16; Mary De Rosa, Summary of Andrew C. McCarthy & David Cole,
Section 218: Amending the FISA Standard, in PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATETHE USA
PATRIOT ACT 65-66 (Stewart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005) [hereinafter DeRosa,
Section 218]; McNabb & McNabb, supra note 46, at 15.
231 DeRosa, Section 218, supra note 230, at 65,
232 See id. at 65-66.
233 310 F.3d 717, 735 (FISA. Ct. Rev. 2002).
234 See Mary DeRosa, Summary of James X. Dempsey & Paul Rosenzweig, Section 206:
Roving Surveillance Authority Under FISA, in PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATE THE
USA PATRIOT ACT 17 (Stewart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005) [hereinafter
DeRosa, Section 206].
235 See Mary DeRosa, Summary of Michael J. Woods & Suzanne Spaulding, Intercepting
Lone Wolf Terrorists, in PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATE THE USA PATRIOT ACT 81
(Stewart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005) [hereinafter DeRosa, Intercepting Lone
Wolf Terrorists].
236 See DeRosa, Section 206, supra note 234, at 17-18.
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broadened the FISA definition of an "agent of a foreign power" to include individuals
for whom no affiliation with a foreign power or entity could be established.237 Once
again, the intent of the amendment sought to encourage the use of the FISA
statutory framework for terrorist suspects.238
Finally, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 made one addi-
tional and extremely relevant modification to the emergency exception to the general
FISC order process. 239 The amendment authorizes the Attorney General to conduct
electronic surveillance in an emergency situation for seventy-two hours.2' FISA previ-
ously provided only twenty-four hours.241 The result is a practical concession that the
executive branch may need the flexibility to conduct such surveillance to address the
modern terrorist threat.242
Congress's amendments to FISA demonstrate the intent that the FISA framework
for electronic surveillance survived despite thejoint resolution authorizing the President
to commit the armed forces following the September 11 attacks. Even if we were to
accept the argument that Congress had spoken through its legislation and the AUMF
did control electronic surveillance in contravention to the FISA framework, this
authority would have been limited to the time required for Congress to react and speak
again on this issue.243 This interpretation would be consistent with the congressional
intent associated with the declaration of war exception to the general court order
process, which was intended to provide the President a short period of executive
discretion, followed by congressional adaptation to the situation by statute.2"
IV. FAILURE TO FOLLOW FISA AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. The Failure to Satisfy the FISA Framework
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, in his Department of Justice White Paper
supporting the legality of the NSA surveillance, argues that the electronic surveillance
conducted conforms and is "fully consistent with the requirements of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. .2.5 The Attorney General does not define "fully con-
237 See DeRosa, Intercepting Lone Wolf Terrorists, supra note 235, at 81.
238 See id.
239 See BAZAN, supra note 117, at 23 & n.40. For a detailed explanation of the emergency
exception, see supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
240 See BAZAN, supra note 117, at 23 & n.40.
241 Id. at 23 n.40.
242 See id. at 23 & n.40.
243 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048,4063; DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 20. This time period would
have ended with the passage of the USA Act on October 12, 2001. The USA Act was the
precursor to what eventually became the USA PATRIOT Act, which passed on October 26,
2001. Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
244 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4063.
245 DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 17.
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sistent," however, to mean full compliance.' Instead, the Bush administration's argu-
ment is that FISA envisions scenarios where the statutory requirements would be
inapplicable to the President.247 Specifically, the administration relies upon section
1809, which details the criminal sanctions levied upon one who conducts prohibited
surveillance, and its provision that "[a] person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally
... engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by
statute." (the Exception Clause).24 This argument then relies upon the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force (AUMF)-the Congressional Joint Resolution passed
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks-as the authorizing statute.249
It is important to note that this far-fetched argument surfaced as the President
scrambled to justify the warrantless NSA surveillance.25 ° In fact, during a press con-
ference on December 19,2005, three days after the public learned about the warrantless
surveillance, the President justified the surveillance by distinguishing FISA as a
framework for long-term monitoring, as opposed to the need for warrantless surveil-
lance to "detect" terrorists. 25' The President's statements show an awareness, or at
least a belief, that the nature of the NSA surveillance operated outside of the man-
dates of FISA but did not rest on a belief that the operations satisfied the FISA
requirements, even to the technical extent argued by Attorney General Gonzalez.252
Even assuming that the President understood and justified the surveillance based
upon this technical and myopic view of the FISA provision, the argument lacks
merit due to the statutory interpretation of the "authorized by statute" provision,
especially in light of its legislative purpose.253 In addition, the AUMF provides a use
of force resolution that the FISA framework specifically contemplated, making this
argument disingenuous and calling into question the President's constitutional require-
ment that he "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
254
246 See id. at 17-23.
247 See id. at 20-21. In fact, this argument is even broader in its application by exempting not
only the President from the FISA requirements but any person who conducts the otherwise
proscribed activities. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2004).
248 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2004) (emphasis added); see also DOJ WHrTE PAPER,
supra note 24, at 20.
249 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 23-28.
250 The President made no mention of this argument during his press conference on
December 19, 2005. See Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3.
251 See id. at 1887. The President stated, "there is a difference between detecting, so we
can prevent, and monitoring. And it's important to know the distinction between the two."
id. at 1889.
252 See id. at 1887; DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 20-23.
253 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 33 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4062 (adopting the nonconforming House version only for the purpose
of providing a good faith defense). This purpose is strengthened by the inclusion of three
explicit exceptions to the court order process. See supra notes 147-72 and accompanying text.
254 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For a detailed description of the AUMF, see supra notes
173-215 and accompanying text.
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FISA specifically expresses and defines the exceptions to its preferred court
order process. 5 The Bush administration's reliance on the "except as authorized by
statute" provision in the criminal sanctions section of EISA unduly reads an additional
exception into this framework.256 The administration reads this provision broadly to say
that it stands for an expansive proposition that any congressional statute that purports
to allow for electronic surveillance could authorize presidential action outside the
FISA requirements." 7 The administration supports this position and interpretation by
comparing the language of the FISA criminal sanctions provision to the Title HI
criminal sanctions provision.258 The Attorney General argues that the Title III pro-
vision, which states, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter,"
shows the ability of Congress to reference internally, and therefore, the different lan-
guage in FISA shows the intent that it apply more generally and not be limited only
to subsequent amendments to FISA or to provisions provided for in Title ll .259 This
argument proceeds upon a misunderstanding of both the Title Im provision, as well
as the language and intent of the provision in FISA.
The legislative history does not conclusively resolve the issue of whether a narrow
interpretation of the FISA provision limiting the term "statute" to only FISA and
Title III provisions or a broad interpretation that views "statute" as referring to any
congressional statute is correct.2' The House Conference Committee did consider
a Senate and House version of what would become section 180 9.261 The Senate bill
sought to conform the FISA criminal sanctions provision to Title IlI and provide that
culpability would follow a knowing violation of FISA, "except as provided in this
bill.2 62 Due to its addition as a conforming amendment to Title I1, the Exception
Clause would apply only to FISA and Title HI provisions.263 The House version pro-
vided for separate criminal penalties from Title Il and included the more ambiguous
language later adopted.2' In adopting the House version, the Conference Committee
stressed that the choice turned on the desire to include "[a] defense.., for a defendant
who was a law enforcement or investigative officer engaged in the course of his official
duties and the electronic surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to
255 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1805(f), 1811 (2004). For a detailed description of these
exceptions, see supra notes 147-72 and accompanying text.
256 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1); DOJ WHrrE PAPER, supra note 24, at 20-23.
257 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 20.
258 See id.
259 FISA, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added); see DOJ WHrrE PAPER,
supra note 24, at 20-21.
260 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 33 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4062.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 See id.
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a search warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction."265 The language
of this defense closely follows what would be later held by the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Leon, to constitute a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.'
The decisions by the Conference Committee to allow for the equivalent of a
"good faith" defense does not counsel either a broad or narrow interpretation of the
Exception Clause.2 67 It does, however, suggest that Congress did not voice disagree-
ment with the Senate bill's Exception Clause that provided a clear and narrow appli-
cation to only FISA and Title III provisions, but it focused primarily on including
the House's "good faith" defense.268
The preference for a narrow interpretation is bolstered, if not confirmed, by the
exclusivity provision found in section 2511 (2)(f) of Title I.269 The exclusivity pro-
vision states, "[P]rocedures in this chapter or chapter 121 ... and the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic
wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.""27 The House Confer-
ence Committee for FISA debated between this language as contained in the Senate
bill and a House amendment that would have added the word "statutory" after "exclu-
sive" to modify and restrict the exclusivity.271 The Conference Committee rejected
the House amendment in an attempt to exercise complete congressional power in
this area and to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.272 Based on this specific legislative history,
it is undeniable that Congress, through its language and its intent, sought the provisions
of Title III and FISA to provide express and complete congressional authorization
in the area of electronic surveillance.273
The expressly exclusive nature of Title II and FISA resolves any ambiguity as to
the proper interpretation of the Exception Clause in favor of a narrow interpretation
that reads "statute" as internally referencing the provisions of FISA and Title In.
This interpretation also coincides with the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation
265 Id.
266 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984). For further analysis of the development of the "good faith"
exception, see Gerald G. Ashdown, Good Faith, The Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented
Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 383-84 (1983). Justice
White argued for this exception as early as 1976 in his dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell,
in which he argued, in language similar to the FISA statute, that the exclusionary rule should
not apply when the evidence "was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his
conduct comported with existing law." 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
267 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 33, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4062.
268 See id.
269 Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. 2006).
270 Id. (internal citations omitted).
271 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4064.
272 See id.; 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
273 See Title III, 18 U.S.C § 2511(2)(f); H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4064.
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known as lex specialis derogat legi generali, which provides that narrow and specific
statutory provisions should supplant general provisions.274
B. The A UMF Does Not Supersede the FISA Framework
The administration's theory that the Exception Clause provides legal authority
under FISA also fails because the AUMF does not constitute an authorizing statute.275
The administration argues that the broad language in thejoint resolution that authorizes
the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
zations, or persons" that aided in the terrorist attacks of September 11 confers upon the
Presi dent the power to conduct domestic electronic surveillance.276 As discussed above,
the administration incorrectly interprets the AUMF as granting broader authority
than either Congress intended or the Supreme Court has recognized.277 There is no
doubt that Congress provided the President the authority to employ the armed forces
of the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the effort to catch the mem-
bers of Al Qaida who were responsible for planning and executing the terrorist attacks.
It is a very different contention, however, that this broad and general language
specifically authorized the President to circumvent FISA' s statutory requirements.278
The strongest argument against the administration's position is found in the statu-
tory language of FISA itself.279 FISA provides an express exception for authorization
during a time of war.280 The President may authorize electronic surveillance without
a court order for fifteen days following a declaration of war.281 The House Conference
Committee explicitly addressed this provision and settled on fifteen days to "allow time
for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a war-
time emergency. '282 The statutory language and legislative history provide a clear
indication that Congress considered the legal framework applicable during wartime and
provided a vehicle for a subsequent Congress to provide the President the authority
needed to address the immediacy of the situation while Congress reconsidered the statu-
tory guidelines.283 When this specific language conflicts with a general statutory provi-
274 See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 6; see also infra notes
347-64 and accompanying text.
275 See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 6.
276 AUMF, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2004).
277 See supra notes 173-215 and accompanying text.
278 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 24; see also discussion of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
279 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2004).
280 See id. For a description of the statutory framework of the Authorization During Time
of War exception, see supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
281 FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811. The House amendments to the Senate bill originally called
for a one-year time period. H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063.
282 H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4063.
283 See id.; FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811.
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sion such as the AUMF, the same canon of statutory interpretation described above-
lex specialis derogat legi generali-counsels application of the specific provision.284
In addition, the subsequent amendments to FISA described above demonstrate
that the AUMF is not controlling law on the matter of domestic electronic surveil-
lance.285 The administration assumes throughout its white paper that Congress has
not superseded the AUMF but focuses on the ability of the AUMF to provide
authority outside of the FISA context.286 Even if the AUMF did initially exempt the
President from the statutory requirements of FISA, the subsequent amendments to
FISA present more recent congressional legislation on the issue of electronic surveil-
lance and should control in any analysis under the Exception Clause. There is no con-
tention, even by the Bush administration, that the warrantless electronic surveillance
program satisfies the explicit requirements of FISA, even as amended. 87
C. The President Has No Inherent Constitutional Power to Authorize
Warrantless Surveillance
The Bush administration argues that even if the warrantless surveillance program
fails to satisfy the requirements of FISA, such surveillance is permissible as an exercise
of inherent constitutional power.288 This argument rests on a belief that the President
holds the exclusive power to conduct the electronic surveillance at issue, thus making
Congress's efforts to regulate in this area unconstitutional.289 This assertion, however,
is unsound because the President must rely upon concurrent war powers to conduct
electronic surveillance, and this would require the President to obtain either congres-
sional authority for the acts or to demonstrate that Congress had not acted within
this sphere of authority.29°
The Constitution distributes power either exclusively or concurrently among the
three branches of government. 291 The Framers of the Constitution debated extensively
over whether to follow the British model and vest war powers solely in the executive
branch or to jettison popular wisdom and distribute them between the executive and
284 See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 6.
285 See supra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
286 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 23-28.
287 See generally DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24; Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference,
supra note 3, at 1889.
288 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6-10.
289 See infra notes 305-28 and accompanying text.
290 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (describing the three categories of presidential power); LouIs FISHER, PRESI-
DENTIAL WAR POWER 1-3, 8-9, 12-16, 20-22 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the legislative
history and extent of the President's war power and foreign power authority).
29' The power of appointment and removal of executive officers is an example of an exclu-
sive power vested solely in the President. The Congress has no power to legislate in this area.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
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legislative branches.29 2 The Framers decided on the latter and vested war powers in
Congress through seven clauses in the Constitution, while also providing the President
the significant power to direct and control war as the Commander-in-Chief. 293 Due
to these constitutional grants, the nation's war powers must be understood to be held
concurrently between the executive and Congress. The question that remains is to
what extent.
Louis Fisher, in his book Presidential War Power, argues that the debates during
the Constitutional Convention demonstrate the clear intent by the Framers to hinder
the President's ability to employ the military unilaterally.29 The power to "declare
war" granted to Congress provided the legislative body with the ultimate authority to
commit the United States armed services to war, while reserving to the President the
authority to repel a sudden attack.295 The notes of the Constitutional Convention main-
tained by James Madison support this opinion. Roger Sherman, during the debate
over whether to define the congressional power as "to make war" or "to declare war"
stated, "The Executive sh[ould] be able to repel and not to commence war."297 Eldridge
Gerry and James Madison agreed and chose the word "declare" in an effort to partition
war powers along this line-providing the President the ability to repel sudden
attacks but vesting Congress with the ultimate authority to bind the nation in war.298
292 See FISHER, supra note 290, at 1-3.
293 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution gives the Congress power
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies...,
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10-16.
294 FISHER, supra note 290, at 8.
295 See id. at 8-9.
296 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
475-77 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
297 Id. at 476. Roger Sherman was the only person to have signed all four major founding
documents: the Continental Association of 1774, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles
of Confederation, and the United States Constitution. USHistory.org, Signers of the Declaration
of Independence: Roger Sherman, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/signers/sherman.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
298 See MADISON, supra note 296, at 476. Central to the delineation of war powers was the
idea that the making of peace, which required Presidential action and Senate approval, should
be more flexible than the facilitation of war. Id. The decision to vest greater power in Congress
to make and prosecute a war was, in fact, a conscious decision and an effort to hinder the ability
[Vol. 15:147
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF WARRANTLESS NSA SURVEILLANCE 181
The concurrent nature of war powers is evidenced by their employment throughout
American history.'M Congress has passed eleven separate formal declarations of war
and numerous authorizations for the use of force, and in most cases Congress granted
the authority after a President's request.300 Presidents in the post-World War II era,
however, have argued and acted against this concurrent power. °1 Military actions in
Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo, in addition to President Truman's use of force
in Korea, all began and were conducted without congressional authorization.3 2
Congress fought the erosion of its concurrent power by passing the War Powers
Resolution (WPR) in 1973 in an attempt to statutorily limit the President's use of
force.303 In fact, the WPR seeks to reassert Congress's concurrent war powers, despite
actually ceding some constitutional powers to the President.304 The fact that multiple
presidents have taken dubious constitutional positions on the use of force does not
justify or validate such actions or change the limits of constitutional language and
intent. In fact, when viewing the list of military actions taken without congressional
approval, the wisdom of the Framers appears reinforced.
The Bush administration rejects that concurrent power exists to conduct warrant-
less foreign intelligence surveillance. 5 The administration does not contend,
however, that this inherent authority derives solely from the President's war powers
as Commander-in-Chief. 3 6 Instead, the administration relies on the theory that the
President is the "sole organ" of foreign affairs. 3 7 The "sole organ" theory is implied
from the President's role as the prime communicator between the United States and
other nations, and supporters often cite to John Marshall's statement on March 7,
1800, in the House of Representatives, that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the
of the nation to continue a war unless the President enjoyed the nation's support. See id.
299 See generally DAVID M. ACKERMAN & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, DECLARATIONS OF WAR
AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILrrARY FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
LEGALIMPUCATIONS exsum (CONG. RES. SERV. 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/RL31133.pdf (providing a historical background on declarations of war and authori-
zations for the use of military force).
31o Id. The eleven separate formal declarations of war were in the context of five wars and
were against: (1) Great Britain (1812), (2) Mexico (1846), (3) Spain (1898), (4) Germany
(1917), (5) Austria-Hungary (1917), (6) Japan (1941), (7) Germany (1941), (8) Italy (1941),
(9) Bulgaria (1942), (10) Hungary (1942), and (11) Rumania (1942). Id. at 4-6. For a list and
brief description of major examples of congressional authorization of military force, see id.
at 6-20.
301 See JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 12 (2005).
302 Id.
303 See id.; FISHER, supra note 290, at 144-45.
304 See FISHER, supra note 290, at 144-45.
305 DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6.
306 See id. at 6-7.
307 See id. at 6-7 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936)).
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nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."3 °8
This authority over foreign affairs may intersect with war powers because supporters
of the sole organ theory argue that the President, acting under this authority, "may
initiate military operations to fulfill the foreign policy.' '3°9 The Bush administration
espouses this idea by citing to the Supreme Court case of United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., which held what Marshall argued-that the President has
plenary power in the field of international relations. 310 The administration then applies
this foreign affairs power and presumes its foundation for the assertion that the
President's power "to protect the Nation from foreign attack" includes the ability to
conduct electronic surveillance to achieve that aim.311
The administration's argument that the President's foreign affairs power provides
inherent authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance fails for two reasons:
(1) the administration improperly defines the collection of foreign intelligence to
include domestic terminal surveillance and (2) the presidential power to protect the
nation from attack does not originate in the power over foreign affairs.
First, the argument that the President has the inherent power to conduct war-
rantless electronic surveillance to collect purely "foreign intelligence"-foreign termi-
nal to foreign terminal communication-is correct and undisputed.31 2 The legislative
history of FISA does not recognize explicitly that the collection of wholly overseas
communication is an inherent presidential power, but it also does not seek to reach
and regulate that area of collection.31 3 The Church Committee Hearings also sought to
differentiate among foreign terminal to foreign terminal communications and those
that include either the targeting of a U.S. person or a domestic terminal.314 The policy
behind placing this authority in the hands of the President is that the effects of
overreaching would damage diplomatic relations and not the civil liberties of a U.S.
person.315 Diplomatic issues are better left to the President under his foreign affairs
power and responsibilities.
3 16
The Bush administration unduly expands the term foreign intelligence to include
foreign terminal to domestic terminal communications.3 7 The inclusion of domestic
places and persons in the surveillance authorized exceeds the scope of the President's
308 10 ANNALS OFCONG. 613 (1800), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/
lwaclink.html#anchor6.
3' FISHER, supra note 290, at 21.
310 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936); DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6-7.
31 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 7.
312 See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 10 (statement by Robert
A. Levy).
313 S. REP. No. 95-701, at 34-35 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973,4003-04.
314 See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 138-39 (statements between Sen. Frank Church
and Philip B. Heymann, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
315 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-20.
316 See id.
317 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6-7; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
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foreign affairs power.318 The reliance on the widely criticized Curtiss-Wright case
to support this proposition also proves the deficiency of the argument.319 In Curtiss-
Wright, the Court provided an expansive holding on presidential power in the realm
of international relations by addressing the ability to impose arms embargoes in South
America.32 The Court explained its holding, however, by distinguishing between
domestic and foreign power, limiting its holding to expansive authority for foreign
power.321 The holding of Curtiss-Wright, therefore, does not extend to support presi-
dential actions against domestic persons and places.322 To act within the domestic
sphere on this issue, the President would need to exercise his war powers-powers
shared concurrently with Congress-and not rely solely on his broader foreign
affairs power.
Second, the Bush administration reaches the erroneous conclusion that the foreign
relations powerjustifies warrantless domestic surveillance by appealing to the President's
authority and duty to prevent and repel a sudden attack.323 It is widely accepted that a
President is empowered with this authority.324 What prompts disagreement is the Bush
administration's claim that this power comes from the more expansive foreign affairs
powers and not the decidedly concurrent war powers shared with Congress.3 25 The
history of the Constitutional Convention demonstrates that the Framers thought this
power to be part of the general delegation of war powers held concurrently between
Congress and the President.326 It was conceded by opponents that the President must
have power in an emergency to act independently of Congress, especially given the
concerns expressed during the Convention debates that a Congress meeting only once
per year could not react quickly enough to counter immediate threats.3 27
This power contemplated unilateral presidential action, but that power would fall
within a limited scope of emergency authorization and then could be limited by con-
318 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320. For a discussion of the deficiencies
of Curtiss-Wright and of the modem acceptance of the President as the "sole organ" of
foreign affairs, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
319 See FISHER, supra note 290, at 69-73.
320 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 311-12, 319; see also FISHER, supra note
290, at 69.
321 See Curtiss-WrightExp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319, 321; see also FISHER, supra note 290, at 69.
322 The Curtiss-Wright case also involves congressional endorsement on the issue faced by
the Court. Though this case was decided before the framework of presidential power provided
by Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, the issuance by Congress of ajoint resolution
supporting the exercise of presidential power would have placed the President's action at the
apex of power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 311-12.
323 DOJ WHrrE PAPER, supra note 24, at 7.
324 See FISHER, supra note 290, at 8-9.
325 See id.
326 Id.
327 MADISON, supra note 296, at 475 (statement by Charles Pinkney).
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gressional action once the legislative body had the time to assemble and speak under
its war powers on the issue.328 President Bush's reliance on the power to repel a sudden
attack, therefore, relies upon war powers shared concurrently with Congress.
D. The President's Authority for Electronic Surveillance Falls into the Third
Youngstown Category
The modem approach to the constitutional validity of a presidential action derives
from Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.329
Youngstown challenged President Truman's seizure of steel mills amidst a nationwide
strike of steelworkers.33 President Truman invoked his powers as Commander-in-
Chief to justify the seizure because of the indispensable nature of steel production
to the war effort in Korea.33' Justice Jackson recognized that presidential power is
not always fixed, but that it may fluctuate in strength due to the relationship between
the President and Congress on the contested issue.332
The Court held President Truman's seizure order unconstitutional.333 In doing so,
Justice Jackson, in a concurrence, provided the framework now relied upon to adjudge
presidential power.334 Jackson sought not to delimit a President's power to act in an
emergency but to provide three analytical categories that allow for a fluctuation of
power dependent upon congressional support.335 The categories Jackson provided are:
(1) the presidential power is at its apex when the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress, (2) the presidential power is within a "zone of
twilight" when the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, and finally (3) the presidential power is at the "lowest ebb" of power when
measures are taken that are incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.
336
Although the Youngstown categories are logical and largely outcome determina-
tive once a presidential action is assigned, the difficult part is determining whether
the action contravenes congressional action.337 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson con-
cluded that the steel seizure order conflicted with congressional legislation upon the
328 See id. at 475-76. This same theory prompted the drafters of FISA to provide for a
fifteen day emergency action clause in the event of a declaration of war. This would give the
President the ability to conduct electronic surveillance to repulse a sudden attack, while
limiting this authority to the time required for Congress to meet, deliberate, and legislate in
response to the emergency. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063.
329 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
330 Id. at 582-83 (majority opinion).
331 Id. at 641-42 (Jackson, J., concurring).
332 Id. at 635.
333 Id. at 588-89 (majority opinon).
334 Id. at 634-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
... Id. at 635-38.
336 Id. at 635-37.
317 See id.
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"occasions, grounds and methods for seizure of industrial properties. ''338 Jackson
found that Congress occupied the field of industry seizures through the Selective
Service Act of 1948, the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947."39 After finding the field occupied, Jackson concluded that the
third category of constitutional power applied to invalidate the seizure order.' Once
the third category applied, the presidential action could only survive constitutional
scrutiny if the President held the power exercised exclusive of Congress.34" '
The application of the Youngstown principles to the warrantless NSA surveil-
lance depends primarily on the characterization of the congressional action on this
issue. The Bush administration argues that the congressional joint resolution in
2001 for the AUMF endorsed the presidential action and placed the power exercised
in the first Youngstown category.3 42 The counter-argument is that FISA occupies the
field of such electronic surveillance and its provisions were not supplanted by the
passage of the AUMF.343
The AUMF contains broad statements of purpose and general provisions capable
of many interpretations regarding the scope of power authorized.34 If no congressional
voice had sounded in the area of electronic surveillance, the argument for implied
authorization by Congress through the AUMF may have been stronger. This is,
however, not the case.
Congress provided clear statements during the passage of FISA to demonstrate
intent to provide the exclusive and exhaustive procedure for the use of electronic sur-
veillance to collect foreign intelligence.345 In the summary of the FISA legislation
passed by the House of Representatives, this intent was clearly expressed by the state-
ment: "The bill.., combined with chapter 119 of title 18 [Title III] ... constitutes
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined, and the interception
of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted; the bill recognizes no
inherent power of the President in this area.
346
338 Id. at 639.
31 Id. at 639 n.6-8.
340 Id. at 640.
341 Id.
342 DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 11.
343 See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 6-8.
344 See, e.g., AUMF, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000 & Supp. II 2004) ("That the President is
authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force .... ).
345 See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 5-6 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3907. The legislation so completely occupied the field of electronic surveillance that it actually
prompted Senator James Abourezk to oppose the measure because of its exclusive nature. In his
minority views, Senator Abourezk argued that the President should have some power in this area,
but that the legislation foreclosed the ability of the President to exercise any power in this area
outside of the statutory framework. See id. at 82, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3967.
346 Id. at 6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3907.
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Prior to the passage of FISA, the only statutory restrictions on electronic surveil-
lance existed for purely domestic criminal action through Title I.47 Title I included
a disclaimer clause found in the original section 2511(3) that did not disturb presidential
power in this area.348 When Congress enacted FISA, it amended that provision in
Title III to remove any deference to presidential prerogative in the area of electronic
surveillance.349
In addition to the clear congressional intent to occupy the field of electronic
surveillance, Congress also anticipated a Youngstown inquiry into this issue.35 ' The
House Conference Committee stated that "[t]he intent of the conferees is to apply
the standard set forth in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure
Case," and to place presidential power in the area of electronic surveillance at its
"lowest ebb. 351
No justification exists for the position that the general authorization language of the
AUMF supersedes the specific and exclusive language of FISA 2 FISA specifically
contemplates the applicability of its statutory framework despite the declaration of
war.353 In order for the AUMF to authorize the warrantless NSA surveillance, authority
by implication from a general statute would have to govern over the specific regulation
found in FISA 4 Such a result would be inconsistent with both case law and generally
accepted rules of statutory construction.
When two statutory provisions conflict, the canon of statutory interpretation
lex specialis derogat legi generali provides that narrow and specific statutory
provisions should supplant general provisions. 355 The Court recognized this principle
of statutory interpretation that the specific governs the general in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., in which the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that a general
statutory clause governing available remedies governs over a specific substantive
preemption provision.356 The Supreme Court also settled a question of conflicting
statutes by holding that a specific statute governs the general in International Paper
147 Title III, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520 (1976)).
348 Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) ("Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to
protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.").
'49 See H.R. RFP. No. 95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4064.
350 Id.
351 id.
352 See, e.g., Cole et al., supra note 115.
151 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811.
314 See id.; AUMF, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
311 See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 6.
356 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U.S. 437, 445 (1987)); see also Cole et al., supra note 115, at 42.
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Co. v. Ouellette.357 The Court resolved the question of whether a general provision
in the Clean Water Act that preserved an injured party's ability to seek relief super-
seded the statute's comprehensive regulation and specific provision of remedies.358
The Court held the specific provisions govern and stated, "we do not believe
Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general
savings clause ....
Under this principle of statutory interpretation, FISA would govern electronic sur-
veillance unless an authorization of military force provided some unique justification
to part with the well-settled principle. 36' This argument, however, was rejected in
Youngstown in a similar context.361 The Supreme Court in Youngstown rejected the
Truman administration's argument that the President's war powers could trump specific
congressional statutes that governed the seizure of industrial property.362 Though
Congress never passed an authorization of force in the context of the Korean War,
Truman purported to act within the scope of the United Nations Participation Act and
in accordance with implied congressional authorization. 63 The Court rejected the
argument that a war context could empower the President to dismiss specific congres-
sional regulation on the utilization of a war power.3
The Bush administration argues that the AUMF requires a broad reading to super-
sede FISA.36' As discussed above, the administration unduly interprets the AUMF to
grant more authority than Congress intended to provide or that the Supreme Court has
recognized.36 In addition, an interpretation of the AUMF that authorized domestic
surveillance would render the fifteen day exception for a declaration of war provided
for in FISA section 1811 meaningless.367 Upon declaration of war, the fifteen day
exception provides a standby statutory authority designed to authorize automatically
limited presidential action outside of the scope of the FISA framework.368 Congress
has legislated standby statutory powers both in the formal declaration of war context
and in the expanded use of national emergency declarations as a vehicle to allow
flexibility in presidential reaction, while retaining congressional statutory control.369
... See 479 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1987).
358 id.
319 Id. at 494.
360 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 11.
361 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
362 See id.
363 FISHER, supra note 290, at 97-98.
31 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 644-45 (Jackson, J., concurring).
365 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12 (explaining the Bush administration's
argument).
31 See supra notes 173-215 and accompanying text.
367 See FISA 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
368 ACKERMAN & GRIMMETT, supra note 299, at 27, 34.
369 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, TERRORIST ATTACKS AND NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT
DECLARATIONS 1-4 (CONG. RES. SERV. 2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/
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The scope of modem standby powers is largely the result of a Senate special com-
mittee initially charted in June 1972 to address congressional displeasure with the
President's use of war powers in the context of Vietnam.37° This Senate committee was
co-chaired by Senator Frank Church-the same Senator who chaired the Senate
hearings that led to the passage of FISA.37' The committee found that no process
existed to terminate automatically national emergency proclamations and sought to
modify standby powers to include a limitation in scope and duration.372 The passage
of FISA occurred after the conclusion of these hearings in May 1976 and the hearings'
conclusions likely influenced the inclusion of a limited standby authorization in
section 1811 in case of a declaration of war.373
An authorization of force provides less, or at least no greater, power to the
President than a declaration of war.374 Thus, because Congress demonstrated in FISA
the desire to provide standby authorization, it would do damage both to the integrity
of the statutory language itself and the obvious contemplation of its application in a
time of war to construe a general authorization of force as superseding its provision
and leaving it without meaning.
Finally, any ambiguity that remains as to whether Congress intended the AUMF
to supersede FISA dissolves when considered in the context of subsequent amendments
to FISA.375 As discussed above, Congress took great strides since September 11 to
modify and amend FISA to apply to the current threats of terrorism, while retaining its
basic purpose of judicial review.376 The conclusion that must be drawn from the
amendments to FISA is that Congress intended the framework to stay in force despite
authorizing the President pursuant to the AUMF. As a result, Congress's intent that
FISA remain the statutory framework for electronic surveillance to collect foreign intel-
ligence places the President's action in contravention to FISA's statutory framework
and into the third category of the Youngstown framework.377 The President's power
would be at its lowest ebb and permissible only if the President retained the power
exercised exclusive of the legislature.37' Because war powers are shared and concurrent
marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS2101701072005.pdf.
370 See id. at 2.
171 Id. at 2; Church Hearings, supra note 7, at ii.
372 RELYEA, supra note 369, at 2.
171 See id.; FISA 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
37' ACKERMAN & GRIMMETr, supra note 299, at 26-27. One of the key modem
differences between formal declarations of war and authorizations of force is the fact that the
latter does not trigger automatically standby statutory authorizations. See id. at 27.
371 See BAZAN, supra note 117, at exsum.
376 See supra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
377 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
378 See id.
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between the President and Congress, the President's action fails the Youngstown
test and is, therefore, unconstitutional.379
This conclusion is consistent with Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Hamdan
in which he specifically referred to the Youngstown test."l He pointed out that the
President had no power to create a military tribunal as he acted in a field with a history
of congressional involvement. 81 This legislative involvement sets a limit on presidential
power. Kennedy stated,
Where a statute provides the conditions for the exercise of govern-
mental power, its requirements are the result of a deliberative and re-
flective process engaging both of the political branches. Respect for
laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis."
V. THE NSA SURVEILLANCE VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment consists of two clausesjoined by the conjunction "and." '383
The first clause is a prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
second clause deals with the requirements for a warrant.3" These warrant requirements
include the justification required for the issuance of a warrant (probable cause) and
the limitations on the scope of the warrant (particularity).3"5 For much of the Fourth
Amendment's history, the warrant clause was read in conjunction with the reasonable-
ness clause so as to give meaning to the vague term "unreasonable. ' 38 Thus, in order
for a search to be reasonable, it generally required probable cause and a warrant speci-
fically describing its scope.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has abandoned this approach and has focused
exclusively on the reasonableness clause without necessarily considering its relationship
to the second warrant clause.387 For example, in 2001, the Court in United States v.
379 See id.
380 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
381 Id.
382 Id. at 2799.
383 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
38 id.
385 id.
386 'Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of 'unreasonable searches and
seizures,' the definition of 'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more specific
commands of the warrant clause." United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972) (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950)).
387 See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (focusing on the
reasonableness of the "totality of circumstances" approach); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985) (finding that school officials do not need probable cause to search students so
long as the search was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the search).
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Knights stated that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. 388
The decision in Knights built upon earlier holdings that recognized that "[t]he funda-
mental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable,
and although 'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant
bear on the reasonableness of a search.... in certain limited circumstances neither
is required. ,,389
An early example of this approach can be found in the administrative search
context. The Court encountered governmental searches in which traditional probable
cause concepts requiring individual suspicion of wrongdoing did not work, such as
housing code inspectors searching large areas for violations. In Camara v. Municipal
Court of San Francisco, the Court turned to the reasonableness clause and devised
a balancing approach to this issue.390 The Court stated that "there can be no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails. '391 On one side of the balance, the Court
weighed the governmental interest or need to conduct the particular type of Fourth
Amendment activity. 392 On the other side of the balance, the Court looked to the
intrusion that a particular search entailed.393 This balance resulted in the validity of
an administrative search adjudged by the reasonableness of its administrative regula-
tions instead of the existence of probable cause.3"
Initially, warrants were required for these administrative searches unless some
exigency was present.395 Over time, however, the Court began dispensing with the
warrant requirement for heavily regulated businesses and when warrants would inhibit
the inspections, with a limitation being the requirement that the regulations provide
an adequate substitute for the particularity requirements of a warrant.3"
The Court has expanded the administrative search rationale to include border
searches, 39 drunk driving checkpoints,3 98 and, by implication, airport searches. 3 9 One
388 534 U.S. at 118.
389 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (omissions in original) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
390 See 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
391 Id.
392 See id. at 535.
393 See id. at 538-39.
394 See id. at 538 ("Having concluded that the area inspection is a 'reasonable' search of
private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that 'probable cause'
to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.").
31 See, e.g., id. at 535.
3% See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1981) (upholding warrantless
inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act); see also United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding warrantless inspections required by the Gun Control Act of 1968).
317 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
398 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
'99 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
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important limitation to keep in mind is that these searches are upheld because their
purpose is something other than the general crime control objectives. For example, in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court refused to allow police checkpoints
to interdict narcotic traffic because the principal purpose of the checkpoint was to
detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing.'
Also evolving from the administrative search rationale is a subcategory often
referred to as "special needs" situations. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion
in a high school search case, referred to this subcategory as applying when "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and [/or]
probable-cause requirement[s] impracticable."40' Reasonableness is ensured in these
situations by limiting the discretion of the governmental officials involved and
requiring a situation in which obtaining a warrant would simply not be practical. 402
For example, the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. stated, "The warrant requirement,
in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a
warrant... would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."40 3 These "special needs" categories
have allowed for warrantless and suspicionless Fourth Amendment activity in
situations such as public school searches,' public employee searches,40 5 and searches
of people on probation.'
It is through the utilization of general reasonableness balancing and the "special
needs" administrative approach that the Bush administration seeks to justify its warrant-
less NSA surveillance program. 7 The administration argues that the surveillance
satisfies the Fourth Amendment and its requirement for reasonableness because the
balance of the governmental interest in protecting against a terrorist attack outweighs
4w 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
4o New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
402 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,663-65 (1995) (upholding suspicionless
and warrantless drug testing because it provides an administrative process with a minimal amount
of discretion); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (holding a warrantless
blood alcohol content search reasonable due to blood's rapid loss of its alcohol content); see also
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The 'special needs' doctrine... is
an exception to the general rule that a search must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing."); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 661 ("It is a mistake, however, to think that the
phrase 'compelling state interest,' in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation
the question: Is there a compelling state interest here?").
401 469 U.S. at 340.
404 See id. at 341-42.
" O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987) (plurality opinion) (work-related
searches of employees' desks and offices).
' Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987).
407 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 37-39.
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the resulting intrusion on privacy interests. 8 It is doubtful that the administration
can argue credibly that the narrow "special needs" exception applies in this case.
A. Administrative Searches and the Reasonableness Balancing Approach
In balancing the governmental interest with the intrusion, certain factors should be
considered. On the governmental interest side, the purpose of the search must not
merely promote general crime control, but the method chosen must be narrowly
tailored to advance that legitimate purpose.' On the intrusion side of the balance,
one looks first to the nature of the privacy interest at stake and then to how the parti-
cular intrusion affects the privacy interest.4 1 In addition, the degree of intrusion will
be found to increase when the government officials enjoy a greater amount of discretion.4"
The first issue to be resolved is whether the purpose of the NSA surveillance
will serve a function other than normal general crime control purposes.4"2 The gov-
ernment interest in the NSA surveillance searches, at first blush, appears to be rather
compelling. The Bush administration characterizes the threat of terrorism as "not
simply a matter of law enforcement," but a war that must be addressed by military
means.4"3 The mere gravity of the threat alone, however, does not resolve this issue.414
The nature of the threat must be considered in relation to the law enforcement prac-
tices used to address the threat. 41
5
When there is an imminent terrorist threat, the use of traditional law enforcement
officials and procedures to address terrorism casts doubt on whether a clear distinction
can be made between terrorism and general crime control.4"6 The purpose of the war-
rantless NSA surveillance is to detect and prevent the death and destruction that
408 See id.
9 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-54 (1995).
410 See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 654, 658.
411 See id. at 663-64.
412 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48.
413 Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1885.
414 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
415 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (refusing to sanction random car stops for
safety violations because the intrusion was great and the method utilized was not particularly
effective given the intrusion).
416 The legislative history for the passage of FISA recognizes the difficulty of drawing this
distinction. When surveillance targets U.S. persons, the Senate recognized that "[i]ntelligence
and criminal law enforcement tend to merge." S. REP. No. 95-701, at 11 (1978), as reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3979. The distinction becomes even harder once it is pointed
out that the United States has addressed terrorist acts through traditional law enforcement
means in the past; this includes the bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi and the
Oklahoma City bombing. See M. Wood, U.S. Struggling to Make Law Enforcement, Military
Models Handle Detainees, Terror Suspects, Forum at U. Va. (Nov. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2005_falllterrorforum.htm.
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comes from attacks on American people and infrastructure.1 7 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine how a car bomb detonated by an Al Qaida operative is dis-
tinguishable from a car bomb detonated by a domestic criminal. In 2002, the United
States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case,
recognized that this distinction is especially difficult when attempting to justify
foreign intelligence collection of a United States person under the FISA definition
of an "agent of a foreign power."4 8 The court noted that "the definition of an agent
of a foreign power-if he or she is a U.S. person-is grounded on criminal conduct."'"9
The warrantless NSA surveillance includes domestic citizens and places; therefore,
it falls within conduct closely associated with criminal activity.' Upholding a warrant-
less search to effectuate this purpose would constitute an expansion of the Supreme
Court's narrow "special needs" cases to include searches that employ law enforcement
officials in a manner similar to crime control.4 2'
The "special needs" exception also requires a narrowly tailored nexus between
the governmental purpose and the means used to effectuate that purpose.422 Justice
Scalia, in his dissent in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, highlights
the nexus requirement by distinguishing the programmatic search at issue from the
special needs search in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association.423 In Skinner,
a case involving employee drug tests immediately following a railroad accident, the
Court upheld the ability to drug test railroad employees due to the demonstrated effects
that drugs and alcohol have had on the safety of railroad operations. 24 Justice Scalia
distinguished the nexus that existed in Skinner from the justification provided in Von
Raab that sought to administer drug tests to customs officials who were being consid-
ered for promotion.4Z In Von Raab, the urine testing sought to protect the integrity of
the Customs Service by discharging employees who, due to their own drug use, may
be unsympathetic to their duty to interdict narcotics.426 Justice Scalia argued that the
nexus presented was too generalized and speculative and could not support a finding
of reasonableness. 27
The requirement of a nexus between the purpose and the means employed basically
speaks to the need for a narrowly tailored program when operating outside the warrant
117 See Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1885.
418 310 F.3d 717, 723 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
419 id.
420 See id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
421 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
422 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-81 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,629-30 (1989).
423 See 489 U.S. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
424 Id. at 684; see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608.
425 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
426 Id. at 682.
427 See id. at 684.
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requirement." The Bush administration argues that the warrantless electronic surveil-
lance is narrowly tailored to prevent terrorist attacks because the program is only
targeted at individuals who are reasonably believed to be associated with Al Qaida.429
There are no indications, however, that such a program can discriminate to the
necessary degree.430 The sparse information released so far on the details of the
program appears to speak to the opposite conclusion.431 There are indications that
hundreds and maybe thousands of Americans have been targeted by this warrantless
surveillance.432 The flexibility, vagueness, and discretion that a definition of a supporter
or associate of Al Qaida entails-which could conceivably include charitable contribu-
tions to innocuous religious organizations--demonstrates how expansive and unguided
the application of such a vast collection program could be when motivated to prevent
a general terrorist attack.433 In addition, one factor that drove the Church Committee
to recommend what would become FISA was the inability for NSA to discriminate
among proper and improper targets.4 4
Even if it is possible for the NSA to discriminate accurately between proper and
improper targets, the core question is whether the electronic surveillance could properly
identify information indicating an imminent terrorist attack. 435 The Bush administra-
tion cites dicta in Edmond that implies that a warrantless and suspicionless roadblock
would be permissible if employed to "thwart an imminent terrorist attack. 4 36 This
dicta demonstrates, however, not that stopping a terrorist attack automatically justifies
a traffic roadblock but that a roadblock may, in a situation when an imminent attack
looms, provide a narrowly tailored means to address that threat.437 Similarly, electronic
surveillance may not always lack the adequate nexus when indications of an imminent
terrorist attack require immediate use of the technology, but the program's four year
duration suggests its use more as a general intelligence tool rather than a narrowly
tailored means to address ripe threats.
438
428 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (holding that random spot checks
were not narrowly tailored to the purpose of ensuring an adequate amount of insurance
coverage); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (labeling the category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches as "closely guarded").
419 DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 40.
430 Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1889.
431 See id.
432 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.
433 See id. (noting that intelligence officials have eavesdropped on people in the United
States who are linked indirectly to suspected terrorists).
434 See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 37-38 (statement by Sen. Walter Mondale).
415 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
436 See id.
437 See id.
438 See id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
659 n. 18 (1979) (explaining that officers at a roadblock could permissibly search for stolen
cars but only if the search could be narrowly tailored to address a highway safety need such
as a high-speed getaway, not the general interest in stolen vehicles).
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In analyzing the intrusion, this situation involves a search of ordinary persons and
of information that often emanates from the home-a place of heightened privacy
expectation.439 This situation differs from an intrusion on school children or on
employees in the heavily regulated railroad industry whose privacy expectation is
lessened.' Further, the Court has long recognized the intrusiveness of wiretap infor-
mation, which further increases the weight on the intrusion side of the reasonable-
ness test balance."'
A further factor to consider in analyzing the intrusion is the amount of discretion
afforded law enforcement. The standardized nature of programs that satisfy the
"special needs" exception do not simply distinguish the governmental purpose from
general crime control, but they provide additional safeguards that address the same
concerns about arbitrary intrusion on privacy that normally drive the warrant require-
ment." 2 For instance, the Supreme Court, in Vernonia School District v. Acton, held
a drug testing program for all student athletes permissible under the "special needs"
exception to the Fourth Amendment partly because the mandatory nature of the search,
rather than random drug testing, makes the program less susceptible to arbitrary
application." 3 An analogous principle is evident in the Supreme Court's willingness
to uphold warrantless and suspicionless inventory searches when standardized criteria
restrict the exercise of discretion of the government official conducting the search.'0
These safeguards are relied upon and held sufficient to protect privacy interests
because they detach the determination of the need for a search from those charged
with administering it.445 In this manner, standardized policies serve the equivalent
function of a neutral magistrate in a traditional warrant process.446
411 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no.").
440 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) ("Fourth Amendment rights
... are different in public schools than elsewhere .. "); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (detailing the heavily regulated nature of the railroad
industry and railroad employees).
44' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
442 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 (explaining that the purpose of a warrant requirement is
to ensure than an objective determination is made as to whether an intrusion is justified).
443 See 515 U.S. at 663-64; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 (holding drug testing of
railroad employees permissible because "the circumstances justifying toxicological testing
and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the
regulations that authorize them").
4" But see Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,3-4 (1990) (holding an inventory search impermis-
sible because in the absence of a policy specifically requiring the opening of closed containers,
the government official's decision to do so constituted the exercise of too much discretion).
44' See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622.
446 See id.
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United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith) remains the only case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the use of wiretaps for national security purposes.44' In
holding that electronic surveillance for domestic security, even in light of national
security imperatives, requires a warrant, the Court went on to say that "[t]hese Fourth
Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances
may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.""' 8 Justice
Douglas, in his concurrence, went even further and stated that given "the clandestine
nature of electronic eavesdropping," the government bears a heavy burden to show
why a warrantless search is necessary." 9 He went on to say that
[t]he Warrant Clause has stood as a barrier against intrusions by
officialdom into the privacies of life. But if that barrier were
lowered now to permit suspected subversives' most intimate
conversations to be pillaged then why could not their abodes or
mail be secretly searched by the same authority? To defeat so
terrifying a claim of inherent power we need only stand by the
enduring values served by the Fourth Amendment.4 0
The Bush administration argues that periodic review and individual authorization
of the warrantless NSA electronic surveillance by the President and the Attorney
General provides the safeguards necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.4 5' This
presents a system of authorization in which the discretion as to whether and to what
extent to conduct a search is fused with those in charge of administering the program.452
The electronic surveillance program, therefore, does not contain any of the additional
safeguards that serve to justify dispensing with the warrant process and the intervention
of a neutral magistrate.4"3
Thus, even though the important governmental interest at stake is recognized, there
is uncertainty whether the objectives of this interest would be served by the NSA
surveillance. Additionally, even if the surveillance did advance the purpose to some
extent, the scope of the intrusion coupled with the unbridled discretion of the executive
presents a program unlikely to pass Fourth Amendment muster.
44' See generally 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (addressing the constitutionality of wiretaps for
domestic surveillance).
448 Id. at 316-17.
449 Id. at 324-25 (Douglas, J., concurring).
450 Id. at 332.
451 See Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1889.
452 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989); Risen &
Lichtblau, supra note 6.
413 See Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 64, 663-64 (1995).
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B. Administrative Searches and the Impracticability of Warrants Approach
The second category of "special needs" cases recognized by the Supreme Court
entails circumstances in which obtaining a warrant would be impracticable. m These
cases generally involve emergency situations in which obtaining a warrant would
result in the destruction of the evidence or in which unique circumstances exist that
counsel against the traditional warrant process.455 Typical examples include the Skinner
case, in which requiring a warrant to obtain drug tests after an accident would have
resulted in the loss of the evidence due to the body's rapid elimination of alcohol,456
and T.L. ., in which requiring a school official, who was attempting to maintain school
rules and discipline, to first obtain a warrant would simply be impracticable.457
Despite its more forgiving requirements for permissible governmental purposes, the
"special needs" emergency exception does not justify the NSA surveillance because
a practical warrant process exists to address the particular needs of this surveillance.458
Congress passed FISA to provide a warrant process adapted to the sensitive and flexible
needs of electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence.459 In addition, Congress included
an emergency exception to this general warrant process to address situations in which
the Attorney General reasonably believes that the gravity and expediency of the need
prohibits prior judicial notification.' The emergency exception to FISA appears to
address statutorily the "special needs" exception in the context of electronic surveil-
lance for foreign intelligence.46' FISA allows for such an exception to apply but takes
away discretion as to its scope and duration by placing statutory limits on them.
462
The explicit FISA emergency exception suggests that no "special needs" exception
would be applicable to electronic surveillance in nonconformance with those limits.
463
414 See Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,533 (1967) (recognizing
that the justification for the government to dispense with the warrant requirement is strongest
when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search").
451 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (upholding a search to
prevent the destruction of evidence of intoxication).
456 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
45' New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
458 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2002) (providing the Attorney General the ability to
employ electronic surveillance in emergency situations for seventy-two hours with only
retroactive judicial approval); Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
459 See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 5 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3906 ("The purpose of the bill is to provide a procedure under which the Attorney General
can obtain a judicial warrant authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes.").
o See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f); S. REP. No. 95-701, at 57 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4026.
461 See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).
461 See id.
43 See id.
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The Bush administration admits that the warrantless NSA surveillance did not comply
with the requirements listed in FISA.4 Thus, with a practical and obtainable warrant
process, the justification for the surveillance based upon a "special needs" exception
would unduly expand the doctrine past its judicially constructed limits and divorce it
from the exigency that supports dispensing with the traditional warrant requirement." 5
In addition, the Supreme Court has been willing to dispense with the warrant
requirement in these "special needs" situations because the existence of standardized
and discretionless criteria makes evaluation by a neutral magistrate unnecessary and
practically worthless. 466 For example, in Vernonia, the program at issue required
drug testing for every student wishing to participate in athletics.4 7 The procedures
for gathering the urine and conducting the drug test were carefully limited to reduce
the intrusion and to reduce discretion." 8 The test results were distributed "only to
a limited class of school personnel" and not otherwise used for internal school
discipline.469 The Court found these standards sufficient to reduce the discretion of
the officials to a degree in which no facts leading to suspicion would exist for a
neutral magistrate to evaluate. 47" There is no indication at this point that the warrantless
NSA surveillance was conducted in such a discretion-less manner. In fact, all indica-
tions appear to suggest that the program was administered based on individual
suspicion and not standardized criteria.
C. Administrative Border Searches
One last possible Fourth Amendment justification for the NSA searches would
be to compare them to administrative border searches. Historically, these searches
have been justified by the "longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself' from
dangerous people or things entering the country.47 ' Since the attacks on September 11,
the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to expand the scope of such searches.472
For example, the Court recently allowed for the total disassembly and detention for
nearly an hour of an automobile that sought to cross into the United States.473
4 See Dec. 19,2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1887; see also Risen & Lichtblau,
supra note 6.
"4 See Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,533 (1967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
'4 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989).
467 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-464 (1995).
4 Id. at 658-59.
469 Id. at 658.
470 See id. at 664-65; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 ("[I1n light of the standardized
nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the
program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.").
471 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
472 See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004) (expanding the
scope of border searches to include the removal of gas tanks).
473 See id.
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The argument to include the NSA surveillance as a border search would be that the
information is emanating from a foreign source and is crossing our borders reaching
computers here in the United States. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed
this particular issue, there is some support for this proposition.474
In 1977, in United States v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court upheld the opening of
eight envelopes at the international border.475 The Court noted, however, that the
search was limited to determining whether the envelopes contained something other
than correspondence. 6 The border officials were not allowed to read any correspon-
dence that may have been inside the envelopes.477
The distinction drawn by the Court in Ramsey between items and correspondence
is critical and likely dispositive on the NSA surveillance issue.47' The justification
for the border search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign
to control "who and what may enter the country." 479 Just as the "what" in Ramsey
did not include the reading of correspondence, it also does not include correspon-
dence intercepted by electronic surveillance.48 °
CONCLUSION
The revelation of the warrantless electronic surveillance program conducted by the
Bush administration was met with criticism across a spectrum of the public. The
general public, unfamiliar with the intricacies of FISA and the constitutional power
aspects of the issue, intuitively felt an abuse of power. Constitutional scholars agreed
but were even more shocked by the clarity and brazen nature of the illegality.48'
The Bush administration responded to the criticism with a comprehensive response
that argued every front of the gathering legal battle.4 2 The comprehensive nature
of the legal response, however, underscored the insincerity of the justifications prof-
fered because it implied an almost self-evident clarity to arguments that, at best, were
grasping for threads of authority.
Despite the numerous constitutional justifications provided by the President, the
argument for permissibility boils down to a reliance on the need to fight the "war on
414 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624 (upholding the search of letters at a border crossing);
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding the search of the contents of
a computer at the border).
411 431 U.S. at 624-25.
476 Id. at 624.
477 Id.
478 See id.
479 See id. at 620.
480 See id. at 620, 624.
481 See generally Cole et al., supra note 115 (providing a letter to Congress signed by
fourteen prominent constitutional law scholars and former government officials).
482 See generally DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24.
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terrorism" through any means possible." 3 Opposing the exercise of this unchecked
discretion over technology as powerful as the NSA yields does not require a finding
of poor motive by the President. There is little doubt that the President genuinely feels
that the warrantless surveillance will help prevent additional attacks on the nation's
homeland. The point is that this determination is not his alone to make.
History is replete with examples of inflated executive claims for necessary restric-
tions on constitutional rights under threat of imminent danger.' Examples include the
internment of Japanese-Americans, the summary military tribunal process and
execution of German saboteurs during World War II, and the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the Civil War. 5 In each of these cases, the nation and the Supreme
Court abstained from restricting the immense power assumed by the President, and
these excesses are looked upon in retrospect through embarrassed and critical lenses.'
Yet, as if inevitable, a similar executive assertion of power surfaces once again.
Perhaps most shocking about the modem abuse is the similarity it shares with those
associated with former President Richard M. Nixon--experiences within the political
memory of the politicians and executive branch bureaucrats currently in power. The
repetition of history's mistakes is understandable, though still not pardonable, when
based upon ignorance of the past. It is condemnable, however, to repeat mistakes based
on an arrogant refusal to learn from them.
Of course, there may be some truth to an argument that warrantless surveil-
lance will increase the government's ability to protect against a terrorist attack. It
is mere speculation to determine the operational effectiveness of bypassing a court
order process. But even if there is some advantage, the real question is at what cost
is this advantage obtained.8 7 Israel's Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Aharon
Barak, addressed and answered this same balancing of security and humanitarian
interests in 2004 when ordering the Israeli army to remove a portion of the West Bank
Security Wall due to its burden on the Palestinians.4s8 Justice Barak's words suggest
483 See Dec. 19,2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1885 ("To save American lives, we
must be able to act fast and to detect these conversations so we can prevent new attacks.").
414 See David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and
Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 237, 238-39.
485 Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 290, at 205-08 (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter, who
sat on the Supreme Court when it decided Ex parte Quirin, as stating it "was not a happy
precedent").
486 See Rudovsky, supra note 484, at 239.
487 A Task Force on Domestic Surveillance in the Fight Against Terrorism was appointed
by American Bar Association (ABA) President Michael S. Greco. The task force included
a former FBI director and former General Counsel to the CIA and NSA. The ABA House of
Delegates adopted the recommendations of the task force at the midyear meeting (Feb.
2006). One of the adopted recommendations states that the ABA is opposed to any electronic
surveillance inside the United States by the government "for foreign intelligence purposes
that does not comply with" FISA. ABAnet.org, Task Force on Domestic Surveillance in the
Fight Against Terrorism, http://www.abanet.org/op/domsurv (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
488 Gareth Evans, President, Int'l Crisis Group, Lecture at the University of New South
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an acknowledgment that to win the war may be a Pyrrhic victory if individual
liberties are sacrificed in its wake:
We are aware that in the short term, this judgment will not make
the state's struggle against those rising up against it any easier
... This is the destiny of a democracy: she does not see all
means as acceptable, and the ways of her enemies are not always
open before her. A democracy must sometimes fight with one
arm tied behind her back. Even so, democracy has the upper
hand. The rule of law and individual liberties constitute an
important aspect of her security stance." 9
The Constitution, of course, is not a suicide pact,4' but it does provide the wax and
rope to block and bind the passions and fears of the moment. If this nation is to sail
past the Sirens' song of terrorism and fear, it must do so with renewed dedication
to our first principles and to the liberties and democratic ideals that make our society
worth the fight.
POSTSCRIPT
On July 26, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings to consider
legislation that would deal with the NSA surveillance discussed in this article.49 '
General Michael Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, presented
legislation developed by Senator Arlen Specter, Chair of the Judiciary Committee,
and the President.492 The proposal would allow the FISC to review the administration's
program of warrantless monitoring of international communication as opposed to
individual warrant and determine its constitutionality.493 The Spector-White House
proposal would rely on the President to seek voluntarily judicial review. Further, if
review was denied, the President would have the right to appeal or resubmit the
proposal until such time as it receives approval by the FISC. This procedure would
Wales, Sydney: The Global Response to Terrorism 10 (Sept. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.unsw.edu/au/newstpad/articles/2005/sep/FINALWurthLectureTerrnorismGE.pdf.
"9 Id.; see also Michael S. Greco, A False Choice: The American People Should Not Be
Forced to Choose Between Freedom and Security, 92 A.B.A. J. 6 (2006) ("The president has a
sacred obligation under the Constitution to protect both the nation's safety and its con-
stitutionally-guaranteed freedoms-and to honor the doctrine of separation of powers. His failure
to do so would compromise the very principles and ideals that we are fighting to protect.").
0 Though this term is often attributed to President Abraham Lincoln, the first known written
reference appears in Justice Jackson's dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
41 See Eric Lichtblau, Administration and Critics, in Senate Testimony, Clash over
Eavesdropping Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A2 1.
492 See id.
493 Id.
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eliminate the need to review individual warrants and would largely make the FISA
procedure, enacted almost thirty years ago, a nullity.4'
This procedure is reminiscent of colonial times when custom officers armed with
writs of assistance could search anywhere they pleased. These writs were issued with-
out probable cause, without any specificity with regard to things to be seized or places
to be searched, and were in effect until six months after the death of the reigning
monarch. These writs provided the impetus for our founding ancestors as they devel-
oped the Fourth Amendment.495 As a matter of fact, in the Massachusetts colonial
court there was a petition by a customs officer for a new writ of assistance after the
death of King George H. James Otis, appearing on behalf of the inhabitants of Boston,
made such an eloquent argument that it moved a young John Adams, one of the
signers of the Declaration of Independence, who described the argument fifty-six
years later as follows: "Otis was a flame of Fire! ... Then and there was the first scene
of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain. Then and
there the child Independence [sic] was bom."49 The administration's proposal is
nothing more than a modem day writ of assistance.
On September 28, 2006, the United States House of Representatives by a vote
of 232 to 191 approved legislation that would give the President the power to order
wiretaps for up to ninety days without a court order. The United States Senate is not
likely to address the bill until after the November election.497 The Senate's approach
of submitting the entire surveillance program to the FISC or the House's approach
of ninety days wiretaps without a court order present a clear signal of more
expansive presidential power to conduct warrantless surveillance of American
citizens. How this legislation will affect or be affected by ongoing judicial review
of the warrantless surveillance program remains to be seen.498
494 See id.
See Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement-The Burger Court Approach, 53 U.
COLO. L. REv. 691, 694 (1982).
496 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 157 (1999).
"' See Eric Lichtblau, House Approves Power for Wiretaps Without Warrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at A18.
498 See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), stay granted
by 2006 WL 2827166 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 2006).
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